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I. INTRODUCTION
A disturbing phenomenon has driven an unintended wedge between
copyright law and estates law. Currently, copyright law effectively prevents
copyright authors' from disposing of their copyright interests through
common estate planning mechanisms resulting in an effect I have termed
"estate-bumping.",2 This restraint on an author's freedom to dispose of his or
her copyright interest at death is not imposed on any other type of property
interest. With the explosive growth of the monetary value of copyright
interests in the United States economy,3 this unique restraint on the
disposition of copyrights will severely hamper important economic and
liberty interests of an ever increasing number of authors. Considering this
restraint is entirely accidental, Congress should reform the copyright code to
preserve testamentary freedom and prevent unintended estate bumping.
Testamentary freedom-the basic principle at stake in this conflict-is
the hallmark principle of estates law.a Basically, testamentary freedom is the
notion that individuals have the right to control the disposition of their
1. In the context of copyright law, the creator of a copyrightable work is referred to as
the "author" regardless of the nature of the work. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
Although the term "author" may seem appropriate when the copyrightable work is a novel, but
inappropriate when the copyrightable work is a painting, film or computer technology, all
copyright creators are nevertheless referred to as authors.
2. I have coined the phrase "estate-bumping" to describe this phenomenon because
copyright law has the disturbing potential of thwarting, or "bumping," an author's dispositive
estate plan.
3. A 2005 report indicated that copyright industries accounted for at least six percent
of the annual gross domestic product of the United States, or more than $600 billion, see
ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & KEVIN A. HASsETr, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
16 (2005), available at http://www.usaforinnovation.org/news/ip-master.pdf, and they are one
of the fastest growing sectors of the U.S. economy, see id. at 7.
4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
cmt. a (2003) ("The organizing principle of the American law of donative transfers is freedom
of disposition."); VALERIE J. VOLLMAR ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO TRUSTS AND ESTATES 21
(2003) ("Perhaps the most fundamental principle reflected in the American law of wealth
transmission is freedom of testation .... "); LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY
PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 7 (3d ed.
2002) ("Freedom of disposition is the hallmark of the American law of succession."); Ronald
Chester, Inheritance in American Legal Thought, in INHERITANCE AND WEALTH IN AMERICA
23, 23-32 (Robert K. Miller, Jr. & Stephen J. McNamee eds., 1998) (stating the proposition
that testamentary "freedom has a strong cultural tradition in Anglo-American law"); Lawrence
M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY
PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 9, 14 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed.,
1977) ("It is often said that the principle of freedom of testation dominates the law of the
United States.").
2006]
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property during their lifetime and upon death. American society has long
recognized the value inherent in protecting each individual's ability to
acquire and transfer ownership of private property.5 Just as individuals are
generally free to consume and transfer property during their lifetimes,
individuals generally are, and should be, free to dispose of their property
however they please at death.
Current copyright law, however, imposes a unique restraint on the
testamentary freedom of authors. The Copyright Act of 19766 (the "1976
Act") permits a statutorily designated group of heirs-ones not necessarily
selected by the author-to control the disposition of the author's copyright
interests after death.7 In effect, this enables unintended beneficiaries to
rewrite, or "bump," an author's estate plan. Thus, it is copyright law-rather
than an author's utilization of testamentary freedom-that determines who
ultimately has the right to profit from the author's works at death.
Given the firm entrenchment of testamentary freedom, why does
copyright law contravene such a basic principle of American estates law?
Quite frankly, the contravention is accidental.8 Historically, American
copyright law has provided authors with a unique "reversionary right" in
their copyrightable work. In effect, American copyright law has allowed
authors the ability to "take back" previously assigned copyright interests in
order to reassign them for a second chance to profit from their copyright
interest. In an attempt to alleviate some unintended ill-effects of previously
enacted reversionary systems, the 1976 Act revised the reversionary system
by creating a new copyright property interest-"termination rights."
Termination rights accomplish copyright law's reversionary goal by
providing authors the ability to retake previously assigned copyright interests
by exercising a non-waivable right to terminate previously assigned
copyrights in order to reassign (by transfer or sale) the copyrights. 9
5. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) ("In one form or another, the right to
pass on property-to one's family in particular-has been part of the Anglo-American legal
system since feudal times.").
6. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.).
7. Id. § 203, 90 Stat. at 2569-70.
8. The legislative history and accidental nature of this contravention is explained in
Part III.B of this Article.
9. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c) (2000 & Supp. 2002). No other type of property owner or
property interest is afforded these rights. Similar restraints never developed in other property
rights, including other intellectual property rights such as trademarks and patents. The law of
patents never followed copyrights into a reversionary system. Likewise, neither did trademark
law, where rights are contingent on use of the mark in commerce and rights continue in
perpetuity until the mark is no longer used. See generally Johanna F. Sistek, Goodwill
[Vol. 38:109
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On their face, the 1976 Act's termination rights provisions were drafted
wholly to benefit authors. Unfortunately, though, the 1976 Act does more
than grant termination rights to authors. In order to protect the interests of an
author's family members, the 1976 Act also grants termination rights to a
statutorily defined class of heirs upon the author's death.' 0 Most notably,
authors cannot effectively divest these statutory heirs of termination rights
nor alter these statutory heirs' respective interests in termination. It is this
inability to divest the statutory heirs of their termination rights that has the
accidental effect of enabling these individuals to bump an author's estate
plan and take the copyright interests in their own right regardless of the
author's dispositive intention.
This conflict between estates law and copyright law is not only
accidental, the conflict is also unnecessary. A policy rationale supporting
termination rights is that by allowing individuals a second chance to profit
from a copyrightable work, individuals will be financially motivated to
undertake creative works, which in turn will benefit public knowledge." This
policy is not naturally at odds with the jurisprudential underpinnings of
testamentary freedom because a fundamental justification for testamentary
freedom is a wealth enhancement rationale. 12 This rationale is based on the
idea that the ability to control the succession of one's personal property adds
value to the property, which in turn motivates wealth accumulation and
strengthens the economy's capital base. Hence, this rationale for
testamentary freedom seems entirely compatible with the policy of granting
authors termination rights in their works. Yet, termination rights were
created (and have been maintained) in a way that not only conflicts with
testamentary freedom, but also undermines the very rationale underlying
Hunting®: The Role of Residual Goodwill in the Analysis of Trademark Abandonment, 22-
FALL ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 8, 8 (2004) (discussing trademarks); Edward C. Walterscheid, The
Remarkable-and Irrational-Disparity Between the Patent Term and the Copyright Term, 83
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 233, 234-39 (2001) (discussing disparities between
copyrights and patents).
10. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203, 304(c). In essence, the copyright code creates a class of
forced heirs. Basically, the term "forced heirship" means that a testator is forced to leave a
certain percentage of the testator's property to certain individuals. In other words, the testator
cannot deprive these heirs from inheriting a portion of the testator's estate-the individuals
are "forced" to be heirs.
11. Ann Bartow, Intellectual Property and Domestic Relations: Issues to Consider
When There Is an Artist, Author, Inventor, or Celebrity in the Family, 35 FAM. L.Q. 383, 384
(2001).
12. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch & William K. S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead
Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 5-18 (1992) (discussing various arguments for testamentary freedom
premised on a wealth maximization principle).
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termination rights in the first place because they give no regard to common
estate planning mechanisms.13
The inability to divest the statutory heirs of termination rights creates
several practical problems. Specifically, termination rights create a variety of
estate planning, economic, social, and constitutional problems. Allowing the
statutory heirs to retake copyrights after an author's death drastically curtails
an author's testamentary freedom and undermines well-crafted estate plans.
In addition, termination rights are ineffective because they no longer fulfill
the original statutory purpose of protecting family members of deceased
authors. Also, termination rights are inefficient because they are duplicative
of family protections provided under states' estates law and are therefore
wholly unnecessary. Finally, termination rights may be unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, the estate-bumping problem has been almost completely
ignored by scholars and practitioners. Moreover, those scholars who have
opined about the topic argue that any conflict between estates law and
copyright law was resolved by the adoption of the Copyright Act of 1976,1
4
which eliminated the previous reversionary system and replaced it with
termination rights. The false assertion that the conflict between the two legal
disciplines has been reconciled creates a false sense of security among
practitioners, which perhaps exacerbates the significance of the true conflict
that remains.
Fortunately, there is time to amend the 1976 Act in order to avert any
estate-bumping problems because the estate-bumping effects will not be felt
until 2013-the earliest statutory date that termination rights may be
effectuated. If left uncorrected, however, copyright law will "bump" the
estate plans of copyright authors and transfer the author's valuable
copyrights to individuals other than those whom the author specifically
intended to receive that property. Absent legislative action, be forewarned:
the era of "estate-bumping" will soon be upon us.
In order to describe fully the phenomenon of "estate-bumping" and its
import, and to understand how to balance estates law and copyright law, this
13. For example, one could argue that by diminishing an author's control over the
ultimate disposition of copyright interests, which is available to all other property owners, the
copyright code unnecessarily devalues copyrights as a property interest.
14. See Francis M. Nevins, Little Copyright Dispute on the Prairie: Unbumping the Will
of Laura Ingalls Wilder, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 919, 931 (2000) [hereinafter Nevins, Little
Copyright Dispute]; Francis M. Nevins, Jr., The Magic Kingdom of Will-Bumping: Where
Estates Law and Copyright Law Collide, 35 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 77, 114 (1988) [hereinafter
Nevins, Magic Kingdom]; Michael Rosenbloum, Give Me Liberty and Give Me Death: The
Conflict Between Copyright Law and Estates Law, 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 163, 201-02 (1996).
[Vol. 38:109
HeinOnline  -- 38 Rutgers L.J. 114 2006-2007
LIBERATING ESTATES LA W
Article will address the philosophical foundations of estates law and
copyright law as well as the important doctrinal developments in each that
have given rise to the current conflict. Part II ("Estates Law") introduces the
doctrine of testamentary freedom; addresses at length the panoply of
common philosophical and pragmatic rationales for a robust right of
testamentary freedom; briefly describes a constitutional platform that might
exist for the right of free testation; and discusses the limited exceptions to the
principle that exist under state law. Turning to the other side of the conflict,
Part Il ("Copyright Law") reviews the concepts of intellectual property and
copyright in general and provides an analysis of the development of the
current copyright law framework, focusing with particularity on the history,
development, and pitfalls of the renewal system and termination rights.
Based on the preceding philosophical and doctrinal investigation, Part IV
("The Basic Problems with Estate-Bumping") describes the on-going
problem of estate-bumping, which assaults the testamentary freedom of a
copyright author and renders impotent sound estate planning. Finally, Part V
("Conclusion and Recommendations") concludes that copyright laws must
be amended to eliminate the problem of estate-bumping and proposes two
relatively simple, yet significant, changes to reconcile the presently
disconnected regimes of estates and copyright law.
II. ESTATES LAW
A substantive analysis of how termination rights under the 1976 Act
infringes upon testamentary freedom must begin with an elementary
overview of the traditional philosophical justifications for, and limitations
upon, testamentary freedom. An appreciation of the jurisprudential
underpinnings of testamentary freedom is necessary because the present
copyright code can potentially thwart an author's desire concerning his or her
estate plan and in turn impact how the author treats copyright interests during
his or her lifetime.
A. Testamentary Freedom
The principle of testamentary freedom, which is the governing principle
underlying American estates law, 5 is simply the notion that individuals have
15. See sources cited supra note 4. However, some scholars are skeptical concerning the
importance of testamentary freedom in American estates law. See generally, e.g., Melanie B.
Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (1996).
2006]
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the freedom (or right) to dispose of their property according to their pleasure
at death.' 6 Testamentary freedom can be viewed as one stick in the bundle of
rights referred to as property rights. The notion that individuals have
testamentary freedom in determining the ultimate recipient of their property
interests and choosing the character of the transfer derives from a general
and well-established property right-the right to control the consumption and
disposition of one's personal property. Thus, just as individuals have the
right to control the lifetime consumption and disposition of property,
testamentary freedom posits that individuals should be able to control the
disposition of property at death.
Yet, the principle of testamentary freedom is broader than a simple
freedom to bequest one's property. In fact, testamentary freedom
encompasses several distinct but interconnected property rights: the right to
gift or devise property during life or at death; the right to choose who
receives such property; the right to place conditions on the donative transfer;
the right to choose the character and timing in and at which the beneficiary
receives the property; and the right to appoint another person to make these
choices."
Generally, there are three ways to manifest a testator's freedom or intent
in the disposition of property at death: Wills, Will-substitutes18 (e.g.,
revocable inter vivos trusts, contracts, life insurance, pension plans, and joint
accounts), and intestacy statutes. 19 In the United States, will-substitutes are
becoming the predominate estate planning tool. In fact, far more property
passes by Will-substitutes than by Will in the United States.2° While Wills,
Will-substitutes, and intestacy statutes differ in a variety of ways, they are
similar in that they each provide a means of effectuating testators' intent.
Even though testamentary freedom is the underlying leading principle of
Anglo-American estates law, complete testamentary freedom is not a
universally accepted principle. Freedom over the character of the disposition
of private property at death is congruent with ideas concerning the nature of
16. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987).
17. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 4, at 7.
18. Basically, a Will-substitute is the functional equivalent of a Will executed during
life. Will-substitutes recognize a testator's intent by including provisions that dispose of a
decedent's property at death according to his or her wishes.
19. When the wishes of a decedent are not known due to a lack of express intent,
intestacy statutes attempt to recognize an individual's testamentary intent by disposing of
property in accordance with "the probable intent of the average intestate decedent." JESSE
DUKEMINIER Er AL., WiLLs, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 62 (7th ed. 2005).
20. Id. at 9.
[Vol. 38:109
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property ownership itself. 21 Even though all societies respect and permit
some form of private ownership of property, there is no society that
recognizes complete and unfettered private ownership of property.22 As the
mere existence of private property does not necessarily lead to the
recognition of an individual's right to control all aspects- of that property
during one's life, it also does not lead to the recognition of full control over
the disposition of property at death. Thus, questions arise as to proper
justifications for the policy of testamentary freedom and what, if any, are
proper limitations on testamentary freedom.
B. Justifications for Testamentary Freedom
Various theories have been offered in support for the principle of
testamentary freedom-some more widely accepted, others more
controversial. In general, testamentary freedom responds to basic human
pleasures and desires and is supported by a variety of economic,
philosophical, and societal values. The simplest rationale for testamentary
freedom is that, in a society based on the theory of private property, the
freedom of testation might be the least objectionable arrangement for dealing
with property succession at the testator's death.23 Other arguments for robust
testamentary freedom are that it is natural, creates happiness, promotes
wealth accumulation, encourages industry, creativity and productivity,
reinforces family ties, promotes responsibility, and allows the testator to
adapt to the needs and circumstances of his particular family. Each rationale
has its proponents and skeptics, but the very breadth of jurisprudential and
pragmatic justifications for testamentary freedom is, in itself, a testament to
why this concept is at the core of Anglo-American succession law. A more
detailed description of the various jurisprudential and pragmatic
justifications of the notion of testamentary freedom follows. 24
21. In the United States, the institution of property revolves around the concept of
ownership--whether an individual can possess particular rights or assets individually and
whether the individual is free to dispose of these rights or assets as the individual chooses.
Accordingly, estates law is felt to be in harmony with property law. Therefore, estates law
overlaps with the domain of private property. Friedman, supra note 4, at 10-11.
22. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Introduction to Chapters 1-4 of DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY
PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 3, 4 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed.,
1977).
23. See id.
24. See generally RONALD CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY (1982)
[hereinafter CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY] (jurisprudence of testamentary
freedom); see also C. Ronald Chester, Inheritance and Wealth Taxation in a Just Society, 30
2006]
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1. Jurisprudential Justifications
a. Natural Rights
One of the oldest rationales for testamentary freedom is the belief that
individuals have a natural right to control the consumption and disposition of
their property during life and at death and that this right predates civil law
and therefore remains beyond the government's power.25 The basic premise,
which is commonly know as the natural rights approach to testamentary
freedom, advocates that individuals, after working hard to create and retain
wealth, are naturally free to do with their wealth as they please during life
and at death.26
The natural rights approach to testamentary freedom first came to
prominence during the Enlightenment Period of the seventeenth century and
is mainly linked with the philosophers Hugh Grotius, John Locke, and Jean-
Jacques Burlamaqui.f In 1625, Hugo Grotius wrote that the freedom to
transfer property by Will is integrally related to the concept of property
ownership and, therefore, it "belongs to the law of nature.' 2 8 Later, John
Locke espoused that individuals have an aboriginal right to oneself and
therefore to the product of their labor and that this right is a natural one,
ungrounded in civil governments. 29 Locke believed that ownership rights in
property are not created by civil laws but are rather God-given rights; in that
RUTGERS L. REv. 62 (1976) [hereinafter Chester, Inheritance and Wealth Taxation]; Hirsch &
Wang, supra note 12, at 5-18.
25. Daniel J. Kornstein, Inheritance: A Constitutional Right?, 36 RUTGERS L. REv. 741,
749 (1984).
26. Note, however, that natural rights philosophers did not and do not necessarily agree
as to the foundational root to the right to testamentary freedom (for example, whether the right
is an inheritance right or a right to bequeath).
27. See J.J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW (Nugent
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1807) (1763); 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JuRE BELLI AC PAC1S LIBRI
TRES [ON THE LAw OF WAR AND PEACE: THREE BOOKs] 265 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925);
JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 134 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner Publ'g Co.
1966) (1690). Note, however, that these philosophers qualified the natural right of
testamentary freedom insofar as it conflicted with the testator's natural obligations to his
dependents. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 12, at 6. But, they recognized greater testamentary
freedom once the testator's children were properly cared for. "[A] Father may dispose of his
own Possessions as he pleases, when his Children are out of danger of perishing from want."
Id. at 6 n.18 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See generally Orrin K.
McMurray, Liberty of Testation and Some Modem Limitations Thereon, 14 U. ILL. L. R. 96
(1919) (providing discussion of various natural law theories of testamentary freedom).
28. 2 GROTIUS, supra note 27, at 265.
29. LOCKE, supra note 27, at 134.
[Vol. 38:109
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he viewed that testamentary rights were as fundamental as other property
ownership rights.3°
Of course, the natural law theory of testation had its detractors.
Eighteenth century philosopher William Blackstone, for instance, held a
positivist view of testamentary freedom. Blackstone viewed property itself as
a "God given" natural right, but distinguished lifetime transfers of property
from testamentary transfers.31 Although Blackstone's concept of
testamentary freedom was broader than English precedent, Blackstone
nevertheless believed property rights expired upon death because nature
protects only the living.32 He stated that a continuing right of property
beyond life "was no[t] natural, but merely a civil right. . . .Wills . . and
testaments, rights of inheritance and succession, are all of them creatures of
the civil or municipal laws, and accordingly are in all respects regulated by
them. '33 Another early critic, William Paley, believed in natural property
rights, but thought that natural rights to property attached solely to the fruits
of one's labor and, thus, ownership rights in every other type of property
were not natural.34
Despite these criticisms, the natural rights argument that individuals have
the inherent right to control the disposition of their property during lifetime
and at death remains a fundamental theory for justifying testamentary
freedom today. In fact, after centuries of being ignored, the natural rights
approach to testamentary freedom has been proffered in various state courts
in the United States. For instance, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in In re
Estate of Beale,35 a case affirming a probate proceeding that admitted a Will
to probate over the objection of one of the testator's minor children, stated
that "the right to make a Wlill is a sacred ... right, which right includes a
right of equal dignity to have the [W]ill carried OUt. ' 36 In allowing the Will
to probate, the court relied on precedent 37 found in In re Will of Hopkins,38
that "the law gives the testator the right to dispose of his property in any
30. CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY, supra note 24, at 14.
31. See Kornstein, supra note 25, at 750-51.
32. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *10-11.
33. Id. at *11-12.
34. See WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 153 (a
new ed. 1795) (stating belief that there was no right to bequeath land).
35. 113 N.W.2d 380 (Wis. 1962).
36. Id. at 383.
37. Id.
38. 79 N.W.2d 131 (Wis. 1956).
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 38 Rutgers L.J. 119 2006-2007
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
manner he may desire as long as it is his own act and free will. '39 Thus, the
court viewed freedom of testation as a natural right that must be recognized
by law.
Later, in Shriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. Zrillic,40 a Florida
case in which one of the testator's descendants sought to set aside a
testamentary charitable bequest under a Mortmain Statute,41 the Supreme
Court of Florida held that the right of testation is not purely a creation of
statute but, like property rights, is grounded in natural law.42 The Florida
Supreme Court acknowledged that some courts may have distinguished
property rights from testamentary freedom rights in that property rights are
inalienable rights grounded in natural law, whereas the right to testamentary
freedom is a creation of statute.43 The Florida court, however, thought this
distinction was irrelevant.44 The court opined that this presumed distinction
had its roots in the English feudal notions of property and that the "analysis
is inapplicable in our society where feudalism never existed and where
property rights rest on an express constitutional foundation that is
distinguishable from the common law roots of feudal England. 4 5 In holding
that testamentary disposition is a protected property right, the court relied on
Nunnemacher v. State46 for the proposition that "the right to pass property by
[W]ill or inheritance is a natural right under the state constitution and cannot
be wholly taken away or substantially impaired by the legislature. 47 The
court held that the right to transfer property by Will is a natural property
right that the state constitution must recognize.
39. Beale, 113 N.W.2d at 383 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hopkins, 79
N.W.2d at 134-35).
40. 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1990).
41. See id. at 65 n.1. A Mortmain Statute allows lineal descendants to avoid
testamentary transfers to charitable, religious or governmental bodies if the decision to make
the bequest was reached during the last six months of the testator's life. See id. at 65 n.3. The
ostensible modem justification for these statutes is to avoid undue influence. Id. at 69. At the
time this case was decided, only Florida, Georgia, Idaho, and Mississippi had these statutes in
effect. Id. at 69 n.5. Today, all American Mortmain Statutes have been repealed or declared
unconstitutional. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
9.7 (2003).
42. Id. at 67.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 68-69.
45. Id. at 68.
46. 108 N.W. 627 (Wis. 1906).
47. Shriners, 563 So. 2d at 68.
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b. Utilitarianism and the Advent of Wealth Maximization
Equally as old as the natural rights justification for testamentary freedom
is a rationale premised on utilitarian principles. 48 Simply, the utilitarian
rationale for testamentary freedom is premised on the belief that individuals
derive personal pleasure out of bequeathing property to others. For
utilitarians, the notion that an individual, while living or dead, held natural
rights of any kind was nonsense; only the greatest happiness principle-the
promotion of happiness (or utility)-could justify the existence of rights.49
One prominent utilitarian philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, professed that the
right to bequeath was a civil right, not a natural right, and that the regulation
of this right should be to achieve maximal happiness.50 Thus, securing the
greatest overall happiness for society provided the utilitarian the basis for
advocating testamentary freedom.
As early as the thirteenth century, utilitarian philosophers argued that
testamentary freedom encourages individual initiative, investments, and
savings. For instance, thirteenth century jurist Henry de Bracton argued that
forced heirship (forcing an individual at death to give property to prescribed
individuals) would diminish the individual's incentive to work and save.5'
Bracton opined "a citizen could scarcely be found who would undertake a
great enterprise in his lifetime if, at his death, he was compelled against his
will to leave his estate to ignorant and extravagant children and undeserving
wives. 52 In other words, these utilitarians believed that curtailing
testamentary freedom subjectively devalues property because one of the
potential uses of such property has been denied to the property owner. Once
48. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 12, at 7.
49. Utilitarians "ridiculed reliance on the 'law of nature' as a way of avoiding
explaining why a proposition is true." Kornstein, supra note 25, at 750. Embracing policies
that promoted the greatest happiness principle for the greater community, utilitarians
attempted to drive a wedge between natural law and normative principles. CHESTER,
INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY, supra note 24, at 25-26.
50. Chester, Inheritance and Wealth Taxation, supra note 24, at 83.
51. 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, BRACTON DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIE
[BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND] 181 (George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel
E. Thorne trans., 1968); see also THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 34
(2d ed. 1953).
52. BRACTON, supra note 51, at 181. The normative virtues of this principle were
followed by later utilitarian philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. See,
e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, in I THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
338 (John Bowring ed., 1962) (questioning whether individuals would frivolously spend their
money during their lives if they could not bequeath their property at death); 1 JOHN STUART
MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POUTICAL ECONOMY 221-22 (rev. ed. 1899).
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the property has been devalued, individuals may be discouraged from
accumulating property, thereby adversely affecting the capital base at any
given time.53
In the eighteenth century, some American legal philosophers embraced
the utilitarian approach in advocating the greatest "perfection and happiness"
rationale for legal structures. These American philosophers advocated laws
that expanded liberty interests so that an individual would be free to
"exercise his powers for his own happiness, and the happiness of those for
whom he entertains such tender affections. 54 In applying this principle to
estates law, Timothy Walker stated that "[a] man may give his property to
whomsoever he pleases, to the complete disherison of his children; and
however unnatural and inhuman this may appear, it will not affect the
validity of the will.
55
Many modem social scientists have advocated a similar theory for
testamentary freedom, referred to as wealth maximization.56  These
philosophers believe that limiting testamentary freedom decreases the value
of property and, accordingly, people will accumulate less property thereby
decreasing the total amount of capital. Robust testamentary freedom,
however, motivates individuals to save and invest. Savings, both direct and
indirect, preserve the economy's capital base, promote employment, and
motivate productivity. 57 Testamentary freedom, therefore, accomplishes the
normative goal of the wealth maximization principle.58
Opponents of utilitarianism have proffered various objections to this
rationale for testamentary freedom. Adam Hirsch and William Wang discuss
various reasons why individuals might accumulate property other than for
the pleasure of bequeathing the property at death.59 For example, individuals
might accumulate wealth for prestige and power.6° In fact, these opponents
53. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 12, at 8. For statements of the principle, see Bentham,
supra note 52, at 338; BRACTON, supra note 51.
54. JAMES WILSON, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 585,587 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
55. TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW 339 (De Capo Press 1972)
(1837).
56. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 12, at 8; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS
OF JUSTICE 13-115 (1981) (defending normative virtues of wealth maximization).
57. ATKINSON, supra note 51, at 34.
58. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 12, at 8.
59. Id. at 8-9.
60. Id.; see also JOSIAH WEDGWOOD, THE ECONOMICS OF INHERITANCE 213-16, 232
(Ralph A. Brown ed., Kennikat Press 1971) (1929). But see B. Douglas Bernheim, How
Strong Are Bequest Motives? Evidence Based on Estimates of the Demand for Life Insurance
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argue that testamentary freedom may lead to a reduction of capital because
potential beneficiaries will have less incentive to produce their own personal
wealth in expectation of an inheritance.
61
Simply proffering other rationales for the motivation to accumulate
wealth, however, does not preclude the possibility that the freedom of
testation has a wealth maximization effect. And in the end, a utilitarian based
rationale for testamentary freedom remains strong today.
c. Orthodox Economics
The orthodox economics justification for testamentary freedom
combines a pure natural rights rationale with a nuanced utilitarian
justification. 62 Simply, orthodox economists view testamentary freedom as a
natural right sanctioned-but not created-by the state.63 This school of
thought has a "slippery-slope" rationale for testamentary freedom-"if the
state could forbid [property succession, then] it could forbid lifetime gifts as
well."64
Orthodox economists, like Rend Stourm, dismissed Blackstone's view
that the dead possessed no natural rights to bequeath property because the
transmission of property by bequest was not an exercise of the desires of the
dead, but rather an exercise of the desires of the living.65 In addition to this
natural rights acknowledgment, these philosophers also stressed more
utilitarian aspects concerning the freedom of testation. Lon Faucher, another
orthodox economist, argued that if the institution of bequest did not exist, "it
would be necessary to invent it because it maximized happiness. '66 Other
orthodox economists emphasized that limitations on testamentary freedom
would dissipate capital wealth.67
and Annuities, 99 J. POL. ECON. 899, 899 (1991) ("This paper presents new ... evidence in
support of the view that a significant fraction of total saving is motivated by the desire to leave
bequests."); Denis Kessler & Andrd Masson, Bequest and Wealth Accumulation: Are Some
Pieces of the Puzzle Missing?, 3 J. EcON. PERSPECTIVES 141 (1989); Franco Modigliani, The
Role of Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cycle Saving in the Accumulation of Wealth, 2 J.
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 15 (1988).
61. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 12, at 9.
62. This rationale is premised on the same type of discourse found in the Orthodox
School of Economic Philosophy.
63. Chester, Inheritance and Wealth Taxation, supra note 24, at 81.
64. CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY, supra note 24, at 26.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 25-26.
67. Chester, Inheritance and Wealth Taxation, supra note 24, at 82.
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Though the orthodox economics approach might not remain as prevalent
in modem discourse about the principles of free testation, the approach
provides yet another brick in the broad philosophical foundation for a robust
commitment to testamentary freedom.
d. Libertarianism
An additional rationale for testamentary freedom can be found in neo-
libertarianism, based on the belief in the complete freedom of the
individual.68 Libertarian philosophers believe that the right to consume
property during life necessarily carries with it the implication of an absolute
right to control the distribution of property at death.
69
The focus of the libertarian argument is on the right of individuals to
control the succession of their personal property. The rationale is based upon
the premise that an emphasis on individual economic production betters all
members of society rather than trying to equalize advancement opportunities
for all members of society. Their testamentary philosophy rationale can be
summarized by one of the more prominent followers, Milton Friedman, who
believes that if one "[p]ut freedom before equality . . . you'll get more of
both ... Individual decisions, not societal ones will produce the outcomes
most of us want., 70 Another follower, Robert Nozick, states that
testamentary freedom is an "essential aspect[] of the absolute liberty which
should be accorded to each individual. 71
Detractors of the libertarian based rationale for testamentary freedom
believe that government interventions are necessary in economic markets to
try to equalize advancement opportunities for all members of society.
Suggesting that the free market does not have the ability to distribute
economic benefits fairly, opponents of libertarianism believe limitations
upon individual freedom are necessary.
While these opponents raise some valid arguments against a libertarian
philosophy generally, the idea that individuals should be free from
68. CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY, supra note 24, at 81-84.
69. For further discussion concerning the normative values of this approach, see, for
example, RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 304 (1985); Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the
Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 704-05, 710-13 (1986); Gordon Tullock, Inheritance
Justified, 14 J.L. & ECON. 465,466 (1971).
70. CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY, supra note 24, at 82 (second
omission in original).
71. Id. at 84.
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governmental restrictions over the disposition of their property during
lifetime and at death has been a bedrock philosophical principle supporting
testamentary freedom.
2. Pragmatic Justifications
a. Market for Social Services
A pragmatic justification for testamentary freedom is that the prospect of
receiving a bequest creates an incentive for the provision of social services to
the testator.72 In other words, an individual's power to bequeath or disinherit
encourages potential beneficiaries to provide services and care that are
beneficial to the testator during his or her lifetime-services that add to the
economy as a whole.73 Thus, testamentary freedom promotes responsibility
by encouraging individuals to care for those who, if uncared for, could
become dependent on society.74 In effect, "bequeathing not only express[es]
but beget[s] affection, or at least responsibility. 75
Since the thirteenth century, many legal philosophers have argued some
version of this theory. Henry de Bracton, for instance, posited that
testamentary freedom gives spouses and children an incentive to treat the
testator well.76 In addition, Jeremy Bentham believed that curtailing
testamentary freedom could diminish parental control because the testator
would have no way of rewarding kindness or punishing cruelty.77
Similarly, it has been argued that testamentary freedom promotes family
harmony. For instance, Blackstone argued that limiting testamentary freedom
made "heirs disobedient and headstrong. 78  Conversely, curtailing
testamentary freedom could undermine family discipline and discourage
72. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 12, at 9-10.
73. Id. For an economic analysis, see, for example, B. Douglas Bernheim et al., The
Strategic Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL. EcON. 1045, 1058-68 (1985). For debate over the issue,
see Maria G. Perozek, A Reexamination of the Strategic Bequest Motive, 106 J. POL. EcON.
423 (1998).
74. Halbach, supra note 22, at 5.
75. Id.
76. WILLIAM M. McGOVERN, JR. & SHELDON F. KURTZ, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES §
3.1, at 123-24 (3d ed. 2004).
77. See ATKINSON, supra note 51, at 34; see also JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF
LEGISLATION 184-85 (R. Hildreth trans., 1911) ("[W]hen we recollect the infirmities of old
age, we must be satisfied that it is necessary not to deprive it of this counterpoise of factitious
attractions. In the rapid descent of life, every support on which man can lean should be left
untouched, and it is well that interest serve as a monitor to duty.").
78. BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *12.
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initiative and ambition. For example, children who know they could not be
disinherited may feel more free to ignore their parents' wishes and become
spendthrifts or unproductive members of society.7
Critics have challenged this view based on the observation that providing
social services generally tends to be inelastic-they are seen in poor families
and in rich, irrespective of the inheritance prospects.8 ° Just as an assortment
of motives drive people to accumulate wealth, so do a variety of motives
inspire people to care for each other.81 Simply, family members will provide
care and comfort for elderly family members even with no prospect of
inheritance.
Discussions about the inelasticity in the market for social services,
however, seems to ignore the intuitive strength of the argument that making
benefits contingent on a certain behavior-here, care for those granting the
benefits-will naturally inspire that behavior. Thus, while there may be some
disagreement from a purely economic standpoint about the mechanics of
social services, the causal link between contingent giving and the provision
of social services seems sound.
b. Promotion of Intelligent Estate Planning
Yet another pragmatic rationale for testamentary freedom is that it allows
for sound estate planning. Generally, testamentary freedom allows for
thoughtful estate planning by allowing individuals to account for the various
needs of the members of their families.82 Proponents of this rationale believe
that when individuals are responsible enough to take the time to write a
thought-out Will or testamentary substitute, it is presumed that individuals
more often than not will know better how to dispose of their property than
the state.83 As Blackstone argued, restrictions on testamentary freedom
79. Max Nathan, Jr., An Assault on the Citadel: A Rejection of Forced Heirship, 52
TUL. L. REv. 5, 15 (1977).
80. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 12, at 11.
81. Id.
82. See McGOVERN & KURTZ, supra note 76, § 3.1, at 123 (arguing that "testamentary
freedom . . . permits more intelligent estate planning than the rigid rules of intestate
succession"); Nathan, supra note 79, at 19 ("[Tlhe parent more often than not will know better
how to dispose of his property than will the state [which] impos[es] an inflexible blanket
rule."); see also T.H. GREEN, LECTURES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION 173
(1882); HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 100-02 (reprinted 4th ed. 1929).
83. Nathan, supra note 79, at 19.
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"prevented many provident fathers from dividing or charging their estates as
the exigence of their families required." 4
Testamentary freedom allows individuals to account for the differing
needs or special needs of various family members by allowing individuals to
choose the timing and character of the succession of their property.
Individuals may rationally want to depart from equal distributions to children
in order to accommodate for each child's differing needs. If one child has
special needs and will need more expensive care after a testator's death, a
testator may want to distribute a larger portion of his assets to help provide
for this child or to distribute the assets through a mechanism that would
protect the assets, such as by utilizing a trust agreement. On the other hand, if
one child is more financially successful than the other children, a testator
may want to provide less to the financially successful child. Testamentary
freedom allows individuals the flexibility to account for their children's
particular needs.
In addition, testamentary freedom allows for the effective timing of
transfers of property. If an individual needs to make lifetime distribution to a
particular family member (i.e., for emergencies, graduate schools, down-
payments on a house, etc.), the testator may want to provide greater
distributions at death to other family members who received no lifetime gifts.
That flexibility would permit overall equality in distributions to family
members while allowing for lifetime distributions to some. In addition,
depending on the character of an individual's assets, and the fluctuations of
the values thereof, more efficient transfers (for tax or other reasons) may
dictate lifetime gifts over death-time bequests.
8 5
Testamentary freedom also allows for the efficient distribution of special
assets. The nature and character of an individual's various assets may dictate
different estate planning tools. Special assets, like family business interests,
may need to be given to family members with specialized knowledge,
business experience or interest, while providing assets of equivalent value,
but of a different character, to the other family members. In addition, it may
be more tax efficient to transfer business entity interests during an
individual's lifetime, while providing equalizing distributions to other family
members at death. Also, the nature of some assets (such as copyright
interests) may be more effectively managed by centralized control, rather
than giving several individuals co-interests in the same assets. Individuals
may want to create a business entity or trust to help manage these assets, and
84. BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *12.
85. See infra Part IV.A (discussing advantages of lifetime gifts over transfers at death).
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transfer their interests in the entity or trust to their children at death.
Likewise, if a child or spouse is unable to manage certain types of assets or
investments, an individual may choose to leave the assets to a trust to be
managed by the trustee. The ability to attend to such special family needs,
that may not otherwise receive accommodation, is in itself a social virtue.
c. Amenable to Modem Family Dynamics
Similarly, testamentary freedom allows individuals to effectively plan
for the succession of their property in relation to the individual's particular
family structure. The concept of the stereotypical American family has
changed over time. Currently, divorce rates are high and many individuals
have multiple ex-spouses, children from different marriages and children
born out-of-wedlock. 86 In addition, unmarried same-sex and opposite-sex
couples are becoming more prevalent in the United States.8 ' In fact,
Massachusetts currently allows for same-sex marriage,88 Vermont and
Connecticut offer same-sex civil unions, 89 Hawaii offers reciprocal
beneficiary registration, 90  and California allows domestic partnership
86. In the 1950s and 1960s, the divorce rate never exceeded 2.6%. Since the 1970s, the
divorce rate has never fallen below 3.5%, and at times it has reached as high as 5.3%. See U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 75 tbl.91 (119th ed. 1999).
For a general discussion of these family trends, see Sam Roberts, It's Official: To Be Married
Means to Be Outnumbered, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006; Eric Schmitt, For First Time, Nuclear
Families Drop Below 25% of Households, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2001, at Al.
87. See generally Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, A More Perfect Union: A
Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 1164
(1992) (discussing implication of estates law for non-married same-sex and opposite-sex
couples); Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical
Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. 1 (1998) (same); T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic
Partners, 79 TUL. L. REv. 55 (2004) (same); Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to
Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1 (2000) (same); E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-
Factor Approach to Intestate Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 OR.
L. REv. 255 (2002) (same).
88. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948-49 (Mass. 2003).
Although same-sex couples married in Massachusetts have all the privileges and benefits of a
married couple, this rule currently only applies to state benefits. Federal law does not
recognize same-sex marriage. Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
89. Civil unions in Vermont are open only to same-sex couples, but grant many of the
same rights and protections as marriage. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002).
Similarly, civil unions in Connecticut are only open to sex-same partners, allowing same-sex
couples the same inheritance rights as married couples. See 2005 Conn. Pub. Acts 10.
90. Under Hawaii law, any "two individuals who are legally prohibited from marrying
under state law" are permitted to register as "reciprocal beneficiaries," HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
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rights.91 In addition to coupling, family for some individuals might mean a
network of nuclear friends or other non-traditional forms of family.
With the changing face of the American family, estate plans have
become more complicated as have estate-planning instruments. Individuals
typically could have, among other instruments, prenuptial agreements, ante-
nuptial agreements, separation agreements, divorce settlements, and powers
of attorney dealing with various property issues. Testamentary freedom
provides individuals the flexibility to provide for these modem family
exigencies without state intrusion.
d. Administrative Ease
One final justification for testamentary freedom is that it is
administratively impossible to effectively curtail an individual's ability to
transfer property-it would be simply impractical to police estates law if
some form of testamentary freedom did not exist. If the state were to prohibit
succession of property at death, individuals simply would find other means
to circumvent the ban and to distribute their property to intended
beneficiaries (such as through various forms of lifetime gifts, creation of
corporations to pay "salaries" to the intended beneficiaries or low interest
loans to the intended beneficiaries).92 In addition, the result of shifting
transfers of property from death-time bequests to lifetime gifts may have
adverse social consequences. By forcing an individual to transfer property
during lifetime, the individual may end up without proper resources during
old age or sickness. As Francis Hutcheson opined, to "[t]ake away this right.
. . men must be forced into a pretty hazardous conduct by actually giving
away during life whatever they acquire beyond their own probable
consumption. 93
§ 572C-1 (LexisNexis 2005), which would entitle the couple to many, but not all, of the estate
law benefits of marriage, including intestacy and elective share rights, see §§ 560:2-102, 2-
202 to 2-214.
91. California's domestic partnership statute applies to same-sex partners of any age and
opposite-sex couples in which at least one of the partners is sixty-two or older. CAL. FAM.
CODE § 297(b)(5) (West 2004).
92. See generally, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 157-60
(4th ed. 2004); Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REv. 69, 100-21
(1990).
93. 1 FRANCIS HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 352 (Augustus M. Kelley
1968) (1755). Similarly,
To attempt therefore to take the disposal out of their hands, at the period of their
decease, would be an abortive and pernicious project. If we prevented them from
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The foregoing was a brief introduction to the traditional justifications for
testamentary freedom. While scholars, theorists, and lawyers may differ
about the relative strengths and weaknesses of any particular rationale, the
very breadth of jurisprudential justifications for testamentary freedom
perhaps explains why testamentary freedom is at the core of succession law
in the United States.
C. Testamentary Freedom as a Constitutional Right
In addition to the jurisprudential justifications for testamentary freedom,
the ability to dispose of personal property upon death may be a
constitutionally protected right, at least to some extent. Recent Supreme
Court holdings imply that, under certain circumstances, federal laws that
prohibit individuals from bequeathing their property may be unconstitutional.
Because copyright is governed exclusively by federal law, a brief discussion
concerning the constitutionality of federal limits on testamentary freedom is
useful.
Although testamentary freedom has a strong cultural tradition in Anglo-
American law, until the 1980s, it was generally understood that the right to
transfer property at death was not a constitutionally protected right at all. In
Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 94 a case regarding the constitutionality of a state's
elective share law, the Supreme Court held that the "[r]ights of succession to
the property of a deceased, whether by [W]ill or by intestacy, are of statutory
creation .... Nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a
state to limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary
disposition over property within its jurisdiction. 95 As a result of Irving,
courts adopted the general view that complete testamentary freedom is not a
constitutionally provided right.
This generally held view, however, has been questioned following the
Supreme Court's decisions in Hodel v. Irving96 and Babbitt v. Youpee.97 In
bestowing it in the open and explicit mode of bequest, we could not prevent them
from transferring it before the close of their lives, and we should open a door to
vexatious and perpetual litigation.
2 WILLIAM GODWIN, ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE, AND ITS INFLUENCE ON
MORALS AND HAPPINESS 323 (Bioren & Madan 1796) (1793). For other statements, see
Michael J. Boskin, An Economists' Perspective on Estate Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES AND
FAMILY PROPERTY: ESSAYS AND AMERICAN ASSEMBLY REPORT 56, 56-66 (Edward C. Halbach,
Jr. ed., 1977); Ascher, supra note 92, at 76-85.
94. 314 U.S. 556 (1942).
95. Id. at 562.
96. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
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Hodel, a case involving the constitutionality of section 207 of the Indian
Land Consolidation Act ("ILCA"),98 the Supreme Court implied that the
right to transfer property at death is a separate, identifiable property right,
and if the state deprives the property owner of this right, compensation must
be paid to the property owner.99 Under ILCA, fractional interests in a tract of
land within a tribe's reservation were prohibited from passing by devise or
intestacy.1° Rather, the fractional interest had to escheat to the tribe if it
represented two percent or less of the total acreage in such tract and had
earned less than $100 in the preceding year.10' The Court found that the
government's restriction on a property owner's right to transfer property at
death was extraordinary because "the regulation here amounts to virtually the
abrogation of the right to pass on a certain type of property-the small
undivided interest-to one's heirs" and therefore amounted to a taking
without just compensation. 0 2 It is important to note that the Court severed
property ownership into separate, identifiable rights-the right to bequeath
property and other rights of property ownership.10 3 Curtailing the right to
bequeath made this identifiable separate property right valueless and
therefore an unconstitutional taking. °4 The Court seems to suggest that
although states can regulate and even abolish intestate descent, the right to
devise by Wills is constitutionally protected. The Court even notes that "the
right to pass on property-to one's family in particular-has been part of the
Anglo-American legal system since feudal times .... Even the United States
concedes that total abrogation of the right to pass property is unprecedented
and likely unconstitutional."'10
5
97. 519 U.S. 234 (1997).
98. Pub. L. No. 97-459, § 207, 96 Stat. 2515, 2519 (1983) (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 2206 (2000)).
99. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 717-18; see also DUKEMINLER ET AL., supra note 19, at 8 ("[T]he
Court's opinion appears to rest on the assumption that the right to transmit property at death is
a separate, identifiable stick in the bundle of rights called property .....
100. § 207, 96 Stat. at 2519.
101. Act of Oct. 30, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-608, sec. 4, § 207(a), 98 Stat. 3171, 3173
("No undivided interest in any tract of trust or restricted land within a tribe's reservation or
otherwise subject to a tribe's jurisdiction shall descend by intestacy or devise but shall escheat
to that tribe if such interest represents 2 per centum or less of the total acreage in such tract
and is incapable of earning $100 in any one of the five years from the date of decedent's
death.").
102. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716.
103. Id. at717-18.
104. Id. at718.
105. Id. at 716 (citation omitted).
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After Hodel, Congress amended section 207 of ILCA by allowing
bequests to a statutory successor class of heirs.1°6 In Babbitt, the successor
case to Hodel, the Supreme Court once again held ILCA unconstitutional.10 7
The Court opined that by restricting bequests to a statutory class of heirs,
"[section] 207 severely restricts the right of an individual to direct the
descent of his property"'' 0 8 and is therefore unconstitutional. 0 9
The Court's renewed interest in protecting the disposition of property
rights through the Just Compensation Clause ° has put into question the
general holding of Irving that testamentary freedom is not a constitutionally
protected right. By applying the tradition of testamentary freedom to ILCA,
the Court has placed some doubts as to what remains of the unfettered
historical right of individual states to limit testamentary freedom as espoused
in the Irving case. This brief discussion of a few Supreme Court decisions
regarding the limits that federal law may place on the right of individuals to
dispose of property at death does not intend to establish convincingly an
independent right to testamentary freedom under the U.S. Constitution. The
existence of some constitutional moorings for testamentary freedom,
however, can only buttress the extensive philosophical and pragmatic
justifications already fully entrenched in Anglo-American jurisprudence for
ensuring a robust personal liberty interest in the disposition of property upon
death.
D. Exceptions to Testamentary Freedom
In theory, pure testamentary freedom places no limitations on how an
individual chooses to distribute his or her property at death. In almost all
states, however, there are statutory limits placed on the freedom of testation,
albeit narrow ones and small in number.11 In addition, these limitations
reflect reasoned (rather than accidental) public policy choices and do not, in
any event, significantly curtail individual liberty. Although the statutes vary
in considerable detail from state to state, the 1990 Uniform Probate Code
106. Sec. 4, § 207(a), 98 Stat. at 3173.
107. Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 237 (1997).
108. Id. at 244.
109. Id.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
111. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 4, at 581.
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(the "U.P.C.") provisions are generally representative of the type of
legislation found in most common law states."'
Because there is no federal law of succession in the United States, state
estates laws govern property succession. 1 3 To date, every state has created
some statutory limitations on the freedom of testation, almost all motivated
by public policy concerns regarding the well-being of surviving family
members. Generally, under individual states' estates law, the testator's
spouse is the only family member afforded any type of protection against
intentional disinheritance-the testator's children can be completely
disinherited' 14 and are only protected against unintentional disinheritance.
115
Furthermore, these state limitations on testamentary freedom remain
quite limited in scope and effect. 116 First, all of them are waivable.1 7 Second,
these limitations are clearly set forth in individual states' estates law statutes
and are therefore commonly known by estate-planning practitioners from
112. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 102-03 (1998)
(surviving spouse's elective share); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-402 (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A.
139-40 (homestead allowance); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-403 (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 141
(exempt property allowances); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-404 (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 141-
42 (maintenance allowance). The U.P.C.'s homestead allowance is not representative of state
law, however, in that the U.P.C. provides a surviving spouse with a lump sum amount rather
than a right to occupy the decedent's residence.
113. Succession law governs all means of the transfer of rights and assets, including
death-time transfers. Similarly, estates law is the branch of succession law that governs the
planning and transfer of property at death. The Supreme Court, in Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314
U.S. 556, 562 (1942), held that "[n]othing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of
a state to limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary disposition over property
within its jurisdiction." This ruling suggests that estates law is to be controlled by state law. In
Hodel v. Irving, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this notion of state control of estate law by
stating:
In holding that complete abolition of both the descent and devise of a particular class
of property may be a taking, we reaffirm the continuing vitality of the long line of
cases recognizing the States' . . . broad authority to adjust the rules governing the
descent and devise of property without implicating the guarantees of the Just
Compensation Clause.
481 U.S. 704, 717 (1987).
114. Setting aside homestead and property allowances, Louisiana is the only state that
provides children protections against complete disinheritance. Nathan, supra note 79, at 5.
115. In fact, the typical estate plan for married couples is for the deceased spouse to
leave the entire estate to the surviving spouse, thereby technically disinheriting children.
116. The limitations on testamentary freedom are so modest, the Third Restatement of
Property states, "Property owners have the nearly unrestricted right to dispose of their
property as they please." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. a (2003).
117. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-213 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 129-30 (1998).
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that state. Accordingly, estate-planning practitioners may be able to "draft
around" these limitations or at least account for them when developing estate
plans. Finally, these limitations generally do not force specific items of
personal property to be bequeathed to a statutory successor class of heirs.,
18
Except for these well-known restrictions found in individual states' estates
laws, the principle of testamentary freedom, in most cases, controls in each
individual's estate planning. As a result, there is generally no mandatory or
forced heirship with respect to any specific item of personal property.
As discussed later in this article, one of the justifications for the creation
of termination rights in a statutory class of successor heirs is to safeguard an
author's spouse after the death of the author.119 However, as explained more
fully below, state estates laws already adequately provide spousal
protections. Therefore, the safeguards afforded authors under the 1976 Act
are duplicative of protections already found under estates law, and the
copyright code's restrictions on testamentary freedom are wholly
unnecessary.
In order to understand why termination rights are duplicative of
protections already found under state estates law (and therefore are
unnecessary), a more detailed review of the common state law limitations on
testamentary freedom is necessary.
1. Elective Share
The most important limitation on testamentary freedom in the United
States is the surviving spouse's elective share or community property share.
In almost all separate-property (i.e., non-community property) states, 20 the
118. Louisiana is the only state that has, to some extent, forced heirship. See Nathan,
supra note 79, at 5.
119. See infra Part III.B.
120. In community property states, all property, assets, and income acquired during
marriage by the labor of either spouse are owned jointly by both spouses. Community
property states do not have elective share laws because, in these states, the marital property
system is based on the principle that both spouses, at least theoretically, equally contribute to
the marital unit's accumulation of wealth. A surviving spouse is therefore entitled to fifty
percent of marital property at death. There are currently eight states with community property
(Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington) and
two states with quasi-community property rules (Alaska and Wisconsin). Interestingly, Alaska
permits married residents and non-residents to elect community property treatment for some
or all of their assets. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.77.010 to 34.77.995 (2004). For a general
discussion concerning Alaska's elective community property law, see Alan Newman,
Incorporating the Partnership Theory of Marriage Into Elective-Share Law: The
Approximation System of the Uniform Probate Code and the Deferred-Community-Property
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state legislatures have decided that disinheriting a surviving spouse is one of
the few instances in which an individual's testamentary freedom may be
curtailed.121 No matter what the individual's intent, most separate-property
states recognize that the surviving spouse has some limited claim against a
portion of a decedent's estate. Increasingly, however, the rationale for the
elective share is not one of spousal support; rather it hinges on the concept
that marriage is a partnership in which both spouses contribute and have an
economic interest. 22 The manifestation of this concern for the surviving
spouse led to the creation of the so-called "forced" share. Because this forced
share is usually expressed as an option or election that the surviving spouse
can exercise or let lapse, this option is now commonly referred to as a
surviving spouse's "elective" share. In general, the surviving spouse has an
election to either take under the decedent's Will or renounce the Will and
take a fractional share of the decedent's estate. Unlike the other limitations
on testamentary freedom, such as family allowance, homestead, and exempt
property allowance, which are discussed below, the spouse's elective share is
subject to the claim against the decedent's estate.
Under traditional elective-share provisions (including pre-1990 U.P.C.
provisions), "a surviving spouse is granted a personal non-transferable right
to claim a [fraction] of the decedent's estate" equal to the spouse's intestate
share (or some fraction thereof). 123 This right is even more limited in a few
states, where the elective share is not even a right to a fee interest in the
decedent's estate, but only a life interest.
124
The U.P.C., however, differs from traditional elective share provisions.
The U.P.C. tries to implement a "partnership theory" for the division of
marital property at death. The policy behind the U.P.C. elective share
Alternative, 49 EMORY L.J. 487 (2000); David G. Shaftel & Stephen E. Greer, Obtaining a
Full Stepped-Up Basis Under Alaska's New Community Property System, 26 EST. PLAN. 109
(1999).
121. The State of Georgia is the only separate-property state without an elective share
statute. Supporting this law, Professor Chaffin, an authority on Georgia estates law, argues
that the vast majority of testators already provide for their surviving spouse and the elective
share allows the surviving spouse to wreck a sound estate plan. Verner F. Chaffin, A
Reappraisal of the Wealth Transmission Process: The Surviving Spouse, Year's Support and
Intestate Succession, 10 GA. L. REv. 447, 463-70 (1976). For an opposing view, see Peter H.
Strott, Preventing Spousal Disinheritance in Georgia, 19 GA. L. REv. 427 (1985).
122. See DUKEMINiER ET AL., supra note 19, at 425; WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 4,
at 582-83.
123. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 4, at 592-93; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra
note 19, at 438.
124. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-436 (West 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 191, § 15 (West 2004).
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provisions is that the surviving spouse contributed to the decedent spouse's
acquisition of wealth and has earned a portion of it. 25 Under the U.P.C., the
size of the spouse's elective share is dependent primarily on the length of the
marriage between the decedent and the surviving spouse. For marriages that
have lasted less than 2 years, the elective share is 3%.126 This increases up to
50% for marriages of 15 years or more. 127 Another feature of the U.P.C.
elective share is that the percentage is applied to the value of the augmented
estate, which includes the couples combined assets. 2 8 In addition, the
surviving spouse's own assets are considered first in making up the surviving
spouse's unlimited entitlement, so that the decedent's assets are liable only if
there is a deficiency.
129
2. Family Allowances
Every state has a statute authorizing a probate court to award a family
allowance out of the decedent's estate to help support the surviving spouse
and dependent children during a limited period of time following the
decedent's death (during the decedent's estate administration).' 30 Upon
death, "[a] decedent's assets are frozen for a substantial period [of time]
while the estate is administered.' 3' During this time, the decedent's family
may be without funds. To avoid financial hardship during the probate period,
125. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 2, pt. 2 general cmt. (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 93
(1998).
126. UMF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 102.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 4, at 596.
130. The method of determining the size of the allowance varies from state to state. In
some states, the maximum allowance that can be awarded is a statutory mandated fixed sum.
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-4-1 (LexisNexis 2000 & Supp. 2006) ($25,000); OfHO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2106.13(A) (LexisNexis 2002) ($40,000); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-
201 (LexisNexis 2001) ($5,000 for spouse and $2,500 for each minor child). In other states, a
fluctuating scale is tied to the surviving spouse's standard of living. See, e.g., CAL. PROB.
CODE § 6540 (West 1991); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1(a) (West 1992). Section 2-404
of the U.P.C. allows a "reasonable allowance," which cannot extend beyond one year if the
estate is inadequate to pay creditors. UNri. PROBATE CODE § 2-404 (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A.
141-42 (1998). According to a comment in the U.P.C., "account should be taken of... the
previous standard of living" in deciding what is "reasonable" as well as "the nature of other
resources available to the family." § 2-404 cmt.
131. McGOVERN & KuRTZ, supra note 76, § 3.4, at 135.
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family allowance laws have been passed to help maintain the surviving
spouse and minor children through the probate process.
132
This family protection is allowed regardless of the decedent's intention
of providing for family members. Interestingly, "[t]he family of a decedent is
entitled to an allowance even if' the decedent has disinherited these family
members. 33 If the Will provides for the surviving spouse, the surviving
spouse can take under the Will and claim the family allowance as well,
unless the Will expressly provides that the surviving spouse must elect
between the two. 134 Thus, the family allowance could be in addition to the
other interests that pass to the surviving spouse.
3. Homestead Allowance
Another limitation on testamentary freedom designed to protect
surviving spouses and minor children is the homestead allowance. The
homestead allowance is a family protection devise under which a decedent's
property, up to a certain value (usually consisting of the family residence), is
set aside by operation of law for the benefit of the surviving spouse and
minor children. Nearly all states have homestead laws designed to help
secure the family home to the surviving spouse or minor children.
35
Generally, state laws grant a surviving spouse or minor children the right to
occupy the decedent's family home for a period of time.1
36
Unlike most individual states' estates law, the U.P.C. allowance shifts
the exemption from a right of occupancy of realty to a money substitute,
which is relatively small and provides little protection. U.P.C. section 2-402
gives the surviving spouse a homestead allowance of $15,000, and, if there is
132. Section 2-404 of the U.P.C. covers "minor children whom the decedent was
obligated to support and children who were in fact being supported by the decedent." UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-404(a), 8 U.L.A. 141-42. The allowance is paid to the surviving spouse for
the use of the children. Id.
133. McGOvERN & KURTZ, supra note 76, § 3.4, at 138.
134. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-404(b), 8 U.L.A. 142; see also MCGOVERN & KURTZ,
supra note 76, § 3.4, at 138.
135. See McGOvERN & KURTZ, supra note 76, § 3.4, at 138-39.
136. Although homestead laws vary from state to state, generally, the law is designed
to help the surviving spouse occupy the family home during the surviving spouse's lifetime. In
some states, homestead is quite substantial in value. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 9, §§ 4-6
(providing homestead exemption for one-quarter acre of land in cities and eighty acres
elsewhere without regard to value); FLA. CONST. art. 10, § 4(a)(1) (providing homestead
exemption for residence of up to one half-acre in municipality, and 160 acres elsewhere).
Section 2-402A of the U.P.C. preserves the constitutional right of homestead in those states
where it exists. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-402A (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 140 (1998).
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no surviving spouse, the same amount is divided among "minor and
dependent" children. 137 Although not granting a right of occupancy, the
homestead allowance under the U.P.C. protects all surviving spouses,
including renters, owners of mobile homes and decedents who owned no
interest in a residence of any sort.
4. Personal Property Allowances
Related to the homestead allowance is the right of the surviving spouse
(and sometimes the minor children) to have a claim for a certain amount of
tangible personal property from the decedent's estate regardless of the
deceased spouse's attempts to devise the property. 138 One of the main
purposes of this exemption of household property is to promote the ease of
the administration of the decedent's estate by relieving the "personal
representative of the duty to sell household chattels when there are children
who will have them." 139 This is the only succession law provision that
requires certain items of personal property to remain with family members,
even if it is against the express intent of the testator. Subject to some
conditions and limitations, the decedent has no power to deprive the
surviving spouse of the exempt items.
Although state exemption property allowances vary from state to state,
the U.P.C. is typical in terms of what this type of state estates law would
provide. Under U.P.C. section 2-403, the surviving spouse is entitled to
$10,000 in the decedent's tangible personal property-which may be a very
small sum. 140 These items are also exempt from creditor's claims.
5. Pretermitted Child Rule
The power to disinherit a child is an underlying implication of the
concept of testamentary freedom. In almost every state, a decedent may
intentionally disinherit children. 141 Unintentional disinheritance is another
matter. Most states have pretermitted (or omitted) child statutes, based on the
137. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-402,8 U.L.A. 139-40.
138. DUKEMINIER Er AL., supra note 19, at 422.
139. UNW. PROBATE CODE art. 2, pt. 4 general cmt., 8 U.L.A. 139. If there is a
surviving spouse, he or she takes the allowance, leaving nothing for the minor children. UNir.
PROBATE CODE § 2-403, 8 U.L.A. 141.
140. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-403,8 U.L.A. 141.
141. Louisiana is the only state where a parent is required to leave a certain percentage
of his or her estate to each child. See LA. CiV. CODE ANN. arts. 1493, 1495 (2000 & Supp.
2006).
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idea that failure to mention a child in a Will was an oversight, so the omitted
child should get a share of the estate in order to fulfill the testator's true
intent. Most state's pretermitted child statutes protect only children born (or
adopted) after the execution of the Will; a few protect any omitted child. 42
Although some scholars believe that pretermitted child rules are
limitations on testamentary freedom, this rule has been developed as a way to
interpret the testator's intent-not restrict their power to dispose of their
property. Regardless of interpretation, pretermitted child rules have little
effect on testamentary freedom.
6. Waivers
The right to an elective share and the other death benefits discussed
above may be waived in full or in part by the surviving spouse before or after
marriage. U.P.C. section 2-213 allows the surviving spouse, before or after
marriage, to waive her right of election and her rights to the homestead
allowance, exempt property allowance, and family allowance.
As discussed above, individual state's estates laws adequately provide
limitations on testamentary freedom that protect an individual's spouse
against total disinheritance. Therefore, considering the testamentary
limitations regulated by copyright law, the safeguards under the 1976 Act are
duplicative of state estates laws' limitations and the additional restrictions
placed upon an author's interests in copyright are wholly unnecessary.
In addition to providing protections for the family, state estates laws'
limitations on testamentary freedom are by far less restrictive than the
safeguards under the 1976 Act. Although potentially curtailing testamentary
freedom, these traditional state limitations have limited effect in the
interference with a testator's intent. As discussed, these traditional
limitations are waivable. Other than the elective share, these restrictions
involve relatively small amounts. In addition, they are all controlled by state
law, so local estate-planning practitioners will be very familiar with them
and can plan accordingly. Therefore, estate-planning practitioners can
minimize the effect of these limitations on testamentary freedom.
142. For a state by state survey of pretermitted child statutes, see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATVE TRANSFERS, Statutory Note to § 34.2 (1992).
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III. COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Foundations and Doctrine of Copyright Law
Although the prior section described what most scholars and estate-
planning practitioners generally consider to be the only limitations on
testamentary freedom in the United States, an additional and potentially
critical limitation is found under the laws of copyright. 43 To the extent that
an individual owns copyright interests, the individual's testamentary freedom
is undermined by the termination rights located under the 1976 Act.
Fully comprehending the incompatibility of copyright law and
testamentary freedom requires a rudimentary understanding of the broad
characteristics of personal intellectual property and a basic knowledge of
general copyright property characteristics. In addition, an exploration of the
origins of the renewal system and the rules regulating termination rights
under the 1976 Act is needed before delving into how these particular
aspects of copyright law fundamentally undermine testamentary freedom.
1. Intellectual Property in General
Intellectual property 144 is a term used to signify intangible yet legally
protected products of the human intellect. 145 At first glance, the phrase
"intellectual property" may seem counterintuitive, because it combines the
transient products of human creativity (ideas and expressions) with the
concept of tangible personal property. 146 Yet, the value of intellectual
property assets is very real. For copyrights and patents, the Framers of the
Constitution provided authors and inventors durational monopolies on their
works and inventions. Similarly, trademark law provides a monopoly on the
use of the mark as it relates to particular goods or services. As a result of
these monopolies, intellectual property has become an increasingly important
143. Copyright interests are the only property interest subject to federally mandated
restraints on testamentary freedom.
144. The three main categories of intellectual property include copyright, patent, and
trademark. This Article limits its focus specifically to copyright law because only copyright
law infringes upon testamentary freedom.
145. Bartow, supra note 11, at 383.
146. See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 19 (1908)
(Holmes, J., concurring specially) ("[I]n copyright property has reached a more abstract
expression. The right to exclude is not directed to an object in possession or owned, but is in
vacuo, so to speak.").
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aspect of wealth accumulation in the United States and abroad.' 47 For
instance, some of the most profitable industries (computer technology,
software, entertainment, telecommunications, and biotechnology) and its
wealthiest entrepreneurs rely heavily on intellectual property laws to protect
the products of their labor. 1
48
2. Copyright in General
In general, copyright law in the United States is constitutionally based
and entirely governed by federal law.' 49 Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
U.S. Constitution provides that Congress shall have power, "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."'' 50 This clause is commonly referred to as the Copyright Clause
because it grants Congress the power to enact copyright laws.
The Constitution's clear primary purpose is not to benefit a particular
"author" or "inventor," but to promote the public's interest in the "Progress
of Science and useful Arts."'15' As a structural observation, this constitutional
power is far more narrowly drawn than other constitutionally created powers
under Section 8, like the powers to "lay and collect Taxes," "borrow
Money," "regulate Commerce," "coin Money," and "declare War.' 52 In fact,
the framers outlined with great specificity both the substance and objectives
of copyright law. As one commentator notes, this constitutional power is
"subject to the limitation that [Congress] could not enact a provision which
plainly did not and could not tend to promote the progress of science and the
useful arts."' 15 3 To this end, the Supreme Court has instructed that the
Copyright Act should be construed to benefit the public at large rather than
to protect an individual author.
154
147. See SHAPIRO & HASSETr, supra note 3, at 16.
148. BRUCE P. KELLER & JEFFREY P. CUNARD, COPYRIGHT LAW: A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE § 1:1.1, at 1-2 to 1-3 (2005).
149. States may not enact copyright protection that conflicts with federal law. 17
U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
151. H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909); see also KELLER & CUNARD, supra note 148,
§ 1:2.1, at 1-10 to 1-11 (arguing that copyright law should protect the author only to the extent
necessary to advance the pubic interest).
152. See U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cls. 1-3, 5, 11.
153. ARTHUR W. WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 31 (1917).
154. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The
copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration..
. The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie
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The general theory underlying the creation and protection of intellectual
property rights is that individuals will expend more time and creative energy
in innovative pursuits and be induced to disseminate learning in society if
authors are given the benefit of exclusive ownership in their works.'55 By
essentially granting an author a durational monopoly on the exploitation of
their works, the Framers provided an incentive for authors to enrich and
develop arts. Therefore, when copyright is granted to the author, it rewards
the labors that "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts. 156
Congress protects interests in copyright, pursuant to its constitutional
grant of power, by extending legal rights to "original works of authorship"
57
that are "fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 58 For a limited period
of time, the owner of a copyright has the exclusive right to reproduce, adapt,
publish, perform or display the copyrightable work. 159 The copyright owner
can exercise, assign or license some or all of these rights or transfer
ownership of an entire copyright altogether. By establishing a time period in
which individuals can exploit and profit from intellectual creations, more
in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors." (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151,
156 (1975); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
219 (1954).
155. Bartow, supra note 11, at 384 ("The general theory underlying intellectual
property law is that individuals will expend more time, energy, and resources in innovative,
creative pursuits if the fruits of their endeavors are likely to lead to financial rewards."). Note
that this rationale is very similar to the utilitarian and wealth maximization jurisprudential
rationales for testamentary freedom.
156. There is disagreement among scholars as to whether copyright is necessary to
encourage the production of creative works. Compare Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for
Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 281 (1970), and Stephen Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75
(1972), with Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for
Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971).
157. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). Copyright law protection extends to the original
expression of authorship, including works of literature, drama, music, art, film, TV, computer
software, and certain other intellectual works, both published and unpublished. See id. §§ 102-
103.
158. Id. § 102(a).
159. Id. § 106 (2000 & Supp. 2002). It should be noted, however, that copyright
protection does not provide authors with absolute monopolies on the exploitation of their
work. In fact, at times individuals might be able to use copyrighted works without an author's
permission while not committing an act of copyright infringement. See id. § 107 (2000).
Under the "fair use" doctrine, which is explicit in copyright law, an individual can make "fair
use" of someone else's copyrighted work if the use is scholarly, for purposes of news
reporting, criticism or various other reasons, as long as the use is deemed fair and reasonable
under the particular circumstances. Id.
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individuals will be inspired to undertake creative endeavors, which, in turn,
benefit the public in general.
Copyrights vest initially in the author or authors of the copyrightable
work. If there is only one author of a copyrightable work, then that author
solely owns the copyright in the work. 6° If multiple authors jointly created
the copyrightable work, then they are all co-owners of the copyright in the
work.1 6' However, in the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the copyrightable work was prepared (and not the actual
creator) may be deemed the author (and therefore the owner) of the work for
the purposes of copyright law.
162
From an estates law point of view, one copyright concept that is
particularly difficult to tackle concerns the difference between the ownership
of a copyright interest and the ownership of the material object in which the
work is fixed (i.e., the physical copyrightable work). The ownership of the
copyright is a separate and distinct property right from the ownership of a
physical embodiment of the underlying work.163 "Accordingly, a copyright is
not [conveyed] simply by transferring a material copy of the underlying
work," nor is the material object conveyed by transferring the copyright
interest. 64 For example, an artist may sell an original painting but still retain
ownership of the copyright in the painting-the owner of the physical
painting cannot make reproductions of the painting without the authorization
of the copyright owner, but the copyright owner may make reproductions of
the image without permission of the owner of the physical painting.
Likewise, the recipient of a letter is the owner of the physical paper on which
the letter was written and, accordingly, may sell or destroy the letter. The
author of the letter, however, owns the copyright and controls the letter's
reproduction and publication. Therefore, for estate law purposes, the
160. See id. § 201(a).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 201(b). "Work made for hire" is defined in copyright law as either
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire....
Id. § 101 (amended 2005).
163. Current copyright law, as enacted by the 1976 Act, states that "[tiransfer of
ownership of any material object.., in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey
any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object." Id. § 202.
164. Rosenbloum, supra note 14, at 171.
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copyright will not pass according to a testator's Will under a specific bequest
of the underlying work itself, unless specifically stated, because a copyright
is a separate and distinct property interest from the physical embodiment of
the work. If the copyright is not otherwise specifically bequeathed, the
copyright will pass with the testator's residuary clause, 165 if any, or under the
intestacy laws of the testator's domicile at death. Care must be taken when
the author wishes to bequeath to the same recipient his tangible works as
well as the intellectual property with which the work is associated.
Armed with a general understanding of the basic characteristics of the
property rights of copyright interests, an exploration of the evolution of
termination rights is now in order. The examination of the origins of
termination rights is needed in order to fully comprehend the incompatibility
of copyright law and testamentary freedom.
B. History of Will-Bumping and Birth of Estate-Bumping
An understanding of the incompatibility of copyright law and the
principle of testamentary freedom requires an historical discussion of the
reversionary systems provided under American copyright law. Pursuant to
the Copyright Clause, Congress has passed several statutory copyright
schemes "to promote the progress of science and useful arts" by protecting
an author's economic interests in copyright. One mechanism Congress
enacted to promote the sciences and arts is the creation of a unique property
right afforded only to copyright authors-a non-assignable reversionary right
to previously assigned copyright interests. These reversionary rights were
first implemented through the renewal system promulgated in earlier
copyright acts and are now realized through termination rights under the
current copyright act. To understand completely how the renewal system and
termination rights evolved, and, accordingly, how they conflict with
testamentary freedom, an analysis of the evolution of these statutory schemes
is needed.
1. Statute of Anne (1709)
The principle that authors should have reversionary rights in previously
assigned copyright interests has a long history in Anglo-American copyright
165. A residuary clause is a provision in a Will that disposes of any remaining estate
assets after satisfying the testator's specific bequests and devises.
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law. In fact, granting authors reversionary rights in their works has its roots
in the first English copyright statute, the Statute of Anne.'
66
The Statute of Anne divided the duration, or time period, in which
copyright protections would last into two distinct terms. The Statute of Anne
granted the author (and the author's "Assignee, or Assigns") the exclusive
rights in copyright for an initial term of fourteen years from the date of
publication. 67 If the author assigned his copyright during the initial term and
survived this term, all rights in the work reverted to the author for a second
term of fourteen years, or a "renewal term."'168 Hence, the copyright renewal
system was created.
The policy underlying the renewal system grew from the unequal
bargaining positions between authors and entrepreneurs interested in
acquiring copyrights. 169 Not knowing how successful their works may
ultimately become, authors often sold their copyright for minimal
compensation.170 As a result, entrepreneurs often realized substantial profits
relative to the author's minimal compensation. Accordingly, Congress
granted authors a unique second chance to profit from their work by creating
a second term of copyright protection free of any previous assignment made
during the initial term. 71 To be clear, the statutory intent was to revest
copyright ownership in the author during the renewal term even if, during the
initial term, the author had sold all property interests in the copyright to
another individual or entity. This concept is currently referred to as
166. 1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). The act was declared to be "for the Encouragement of
Learning, by vesting the Copies of printed Books in the Authors." Id. The preamble clarifies
that the purpose of the act was "for the Encouragement of learned Men to compose and write
useful Books." Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 14 (1909) ("It not infrequently happens that the
author sells his copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively small sum. If the work
proves to be a great success and lives beyond the [initial] term .... your committee felt that it
should be the exclusive right of the author to take the renewal term, and the law should be
framed as is the existing law, so that he could not be deprived of that right."). This
paternalistic approach stemmed from the widely held view that publishers and other large
corporate entrepreneurs would naturally have superior bargaining positions. In reality, "unlike
real property ... [a copyright] is by its very nature incapable of accurate monetary evaluation
prior to its exploitation." MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
9.02, at 9-30 (1996).
170. KELLER & CUNARD, supra note 148, § 7:4, at 7-13 to 7-14.
171. See NiMMER&NMMER, supra note 169, § 9.02, at 9-29.
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"contract-bumping"'' 72 in that the copyright law intentionally "bumps"
contractual assignments of copyright interests.
Contract-bumping seems to be the clear intent of the renewal system
under the Statute of Anne.173 In order to make contract-bumping feasible,
however, the author must be precluded from assigning or waiving renewal
term rights. If it were permissible to assign or waive this right to renew, a
buyer of any copyright interest would insist upon the author waiving any
such renewal right. In the English case of Carnan v. Bowles,174 however, the
High Court of Chancery ruled that if the author, during the initial term,
explicitly assigned or waived the rights of the renewal term, the author could
not use the statute to reclaim, or bump, the copyright assignment if he lived
into the renewal term. 175 Therefore, contract-bumping was not absolute
despite the clear intent of the Statute of Anne.
Although intentionally creating a potential conflict between contract law
and copyright law, the Statute of Anne did not create a conflict between
estates law and copyright law because the author's survival of the initial term
was a prerequisite of the vesting of renewal rights. In other words, if the
author died during the initial term, any previous assignment or bequest of
any remaining copyright interest was protected until the end of the initial
term, after which, the copyright simply fell into the public domain. 7 6 In
addition, if the author survived the initial term, the author could freely assign
or bequeath the revested copyright interests until the end of the renewal
term. 177 Conversely, if the author died during the initial term, the author
could not assign or bequeath the renewal rights because the author's survival
of the initial term is a prerequisite to the renewal term's existence.
78
Therefore, the copyright law under the Statute of Anne did not undermine the
author's testamentary intent concerning his or her rights in a copyrightable
work.
The Statute of Anne created the two-term renewal system for copyright
works and tried to establish a contract-bumping regime that would allow
authors a second chance to profit from their works. The contract-bumping
172. The term "contract-bumping" was coined by Francis M. Nevins in The Magic
Kingdom of Will-Bumping: Where Estates Law and Copyright Law Collide. See Nevins,
Magic Kingdom, supra note 14, at 89.
173. See id. at 82.
174. (1786) 29 Eng. Rep. 45 (Ch.).
175. Id. at 46-47.
176. Nevins, Magic Kingdom, supra note 14, at 82.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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regime, however, was not completely effective because courts allowed
authors to assign away their renewal rights, thereby undermining the
reversionary aspects of the Statute of Anne. Even though the Statute of Anne
codified the renewal system, however, it did not create a conflict between
copyright law and testamentary freedom. It is only later in the history of
copyright law that reversionary rights began to interfere with the freedom of
testation. Nevertheless, it remains essential to address the source of renewal
rights at this very early stage in order to understand both that copyright law
and testamentary freedom need not conflict and that the development of the
current copyright code which undermines testamentary freedom is at odds
from the historical beginnings of renewal rights themselves.
2. The Copyright Act of 1790
In 1790, soon after ratification of the Constitution, "An Act for the
encouragement of learning" was passed during the First Congress (the "1790
Act").1 79 Inspired by the Statute of Anne, Congress wanted to grant authors a
second opportunity to benefit from their works after an original assignment.
Accordingly, the 1790 Act virtually duplicated the Statute of Anne's two-
term renewal system. 1
80
In general, the 1790 Act stated that authors and their assigns held
exclusive rights in a copyright work for an initial term of fourteen years
beginning upon the work's date of publication.1 81 If authors assigned their
rights in the copyrightable work during this initial term, the authors could
later recapture these assigned rights by securing a second term of fourteen
years. To secure a second term, the authors had to be alive at the end of the
initial term and had to duly exercise their renewal right. 82 In other words, all
previously assigned, sold or gifted copyright interests reverted back to the
author in the second term. Thus, the renewal system was implemented in the
United States.
Similar to the Statute of Anne, there was no conflict between
testamentary freedom and copyright law under the 1790 Act. If the author
died during the initial term, any initial term rights held by the author passed
by his or her Will. 83 Any rights that the author transferred for the initial term
179. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (repealed 1831).
180. Rosenbloum, supra note 14, at 167.
181. Nevins, Magic Kingdom, supra note 14, at 83.
182. Id.
183. § 1, 1 Stat. at 124.
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remained with the transferee.' 84 At the end of the initial term, the copyright
fell into the public domain extinguishing all rights associated with the
copyright. 185 Any transfer of rights for the renewal term essentially adeemed
because no renewal term was available due to the author's death.
Further, the 1790 Act did not conflict with testamentary freedom when
an author survived to secure the renewal term. Authors were free to transfer
rights to the renewal term during both the initial term and renewal term. 86
As discussed above, however, the author had to live into the renewal term in
order for the transfer of renewal term rights to vest in the transferee. If the
renewal term rights had vested in the author, those rights would simply pass
by Will upon the author's death.
3. The Copyright Act of 1831
The Copyright Act of 1831 (the "1831 Act") 187 dramatically changed the
renewal system structure in two important ways. First, even though the 1831
Act generally kept the two-term renewal system,188 the renewal term was no
longer conceptually thought of as an extension of the initial term, but rather
as a legally separate and independent right. 89 Second, the copyright statute
provided, for the first time, that a statutorily-created successor class of heirs
could exercise the renewal term rights if the author died during the first
term."9
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870).
188. The 1831 Act increased the initial term to twenty-eight years while maintaining
the fourteen-year renewal term.
189. In Pierpont v. Fowle, 19 F. Cas. 652 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 11,152), the court
opined that, as a result of the 1831 Act, the renewal term was a distinct legal entity from that
of the initial term: "[I]t is rather like a new interest obtained by one after the original interest
had expired," id. at 660.
190. § 2, 4 Stat. at 436. Another revision to the copyright statute was in response to
legal precedent. In order to improve the bargaining position of authors, Congress intended that
copyright law "bump" copyright assignments executed during the copyright's initial term
insofar as the conveyance purported to extend into the renewal term-similar to the original
intent of the contract-bumping regime under the Statute of Anne. The 1831 Act tried to
remove the holding of Carnan v. Bowles, (1786) 29 Eng. Rep. 45 (Ch.), from American
copyright law, which undermined the contract-bumping intent under English copyright law,
id. at 46. Yet, similar to the English courts, the Supreme Court in Paige v. Banks, 80 U.S. 608
(1871), held that if an author, prior to 1831, "forever" assigned the copyright in his work
during the initial term and the author survived into the renewal term, the author was bound by
his conveyance, id. at 614-15. As a result, the assignee was entitled to renew the copyright and
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With the creation of a statutorily-mandated successor class of heirs, the
conflict between testamentary freedom and copyright law was codified.
Under the 1790 Act and the Statute of Anne, a work would fall into the
public domain at the end of the initial term if the author died during the
work's initial term. Under the 1831 Act, however, if the author died during
the initial term, the work did not automatically fall into public domain but,
instead, the renewal term rights (and any profits from the future exploitation
of the copyright) passed to the statutory successor class (regardless of the
author's intent), which consisted of the author's surviving spouse and
children. 191 As a result, this statutory successor class could supersede the
intent of an author's inter vivos transfers by taking back assignments made
by the author prior to his or her death. Only if the author had no surviving
spouse or children, or if nobody exercised the renewal right, would the work
pass into the public domain. Because the renewal term right was considered a
legally separate and independent right, Congress, in effect, granted to these
statutory heirs 192 a contingent remainder property right subject to a condition
precedent. 193
Furthermore, the 1831 Act did not specify how the renewal rights were
to be divided among the statutory class. While the intent was to provide for
the family generally, it seems that the interests of the individuals in the class
were not considered. Thus, bequests of copyright interests, even to those
within the statutory class, were not guaranteed to follow the author's
testamentary intent, resulting in an additional limitation on the author's
testamentary freedom.
own the interest in the second term rights, thereby limiting the effectiveness of contract-
bumping. Id. at 615.
191. § 2, 4 Stat. at 436.
192. In White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247 (1st Cir. 1911), the
court of appeals stated that the 1831 Act "broke up the continuity of title, and gave the right of
renewal to the widow or child or children. . . . Here, then, was an entirely new policy,
completely dissevering the title, breaking up the continuance in a proper sense of the word,
whatever terms might be used, and vesting an absolutely new title eo nomine in the persons
designated." Id. at 250.
193. An interest will be classified as contingent if its taking possession is subject to a
condition precedent, or contingent as to an event. On the other hand, Congress might have
created a vested remainder property interest subject to total divestment. A vested remainder
subject to total divestment occurs when the remaindermen are ascertainable and their interest
is not subject to any condition precedent, but their right to possession and enjoyment is subject
to being defeated by the happening of some condition subsequent-here, the condition
subsequent being the author surviving the initial term. Regardless, Congress has created a real
property interest in the statutory heirs.
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The main policy reason for creating a statutory class of heirs was to
provide protection for surviving family members after the author's death. 194
If an author died during the initial term, Congress wanted to prevent the
work from arbitrarily falling into the public domain when, because of the
author's death, "his family stand in more need of the only means of
subsistence ordinarily left to them."195 As the Supreme Court has noted, "The
evident purpose of [the renewal provision] is to provide for the family of the
author after his death. Since the author cannot assign his family's renewal
rights, [the renewal provision] takes the form of a compulsory bequest of the
copyright to the designated persons. 196
Unfortunately, Congress did not consider the effect that creating a
separate property interest in a statutorily mandated successor class of heirs
would have on the author's testamentary freedom. By excluding the author's
assignee or assigns as part of the successor class members, copyright law
could bump the testamentary intent of an author because the statutory heirs
potentially could exercise the renewal rights and bump any inter-vivos
assignments or testamentary bequests of copyright interests. Therefore, by
creating a statutorily mandated successor class of heirs, Congress
unintentionally, but severely, restricted a copyright owner's testamentary
freedom1 97 and thus created the phenomenon currently referred to as "Will-
bumping."
198
a. The Basic Problem of Will-Bumping
By mandating a non-discretionary hierarchy of individuals who are
entitled to the renewal term rights, the 1831 Act severely limited an author's
194. However, surviving family members already are protected under states' estate
law. See supra Part II.D. Query why the federal government deemed that copyright interests
should be the only property right afforded extra protections for surviving family members?
195. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 651 (1943) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
196. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 582 (1956).
197. The legislative history demonstrates that Congress's purpose in creating the
renewal system was to increase the bargaining positions of authors. In addition, legislative
history shows that the creation of the statutory class of heirs was intended to protect the
author's family after the death of the author. The silence in the history concerning the newly
created conflict with testamentary freedom implies that Congress never realized that a renewal
system with a statutory class of successors could severely curtail an author's ability to control
the disposition of his or her copyright interest.
198. The term "Will-bumping" was coined by Francis M. Nevins in The Magic
Kingdom of Will-Bumping: Where Estates Law and Copyright Law Collide. Nevins, Magic
Kingdom, supra note 14, at 78.
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otherwise unfettered right to make inter vivos or testamentary transfers of
copyright interests, and it had the ability to thwart an author's Will and
disrupt an otherwise well-crafted estate plan. Initially, the right to renewal
vested in the author if he or she was living at the beginning of the renewal
term. 199 If the author lived to renew a particular work and died in the work's
renewal term, the remainder of the renewal term rights passed under the
usual rules of testamentary succession or a state's intestate law.200 However,
if the author died during the initial term, his or her Will governed only the
remainder of the initial term rights and the renewal rights did not pass under
the usual rules of testamentary succession or a state's intestate law. Rather,
renewal rights automatically vested in a mandated statutory class of heirs and
these statutory heirs could retake ownership of the copyright. 20 1 Therefore, it
is copyright law rather than the author that determined who ultimately
profited from the copyrighted work.
The Will-bumping problem arose because the hierarchy of the statutory
class of heirs created under the 1831 Act could not be altered by the author.
If the renewal rights did not vest in the author, the members of the statutory
class of heirs took ownership of the renewal term rights regardless of any
gifts made by the author or any bequests in the author's Will. For example, if
the author died in the initial term, survived by a spouse and/or children,
copyright law-and not the author's Will-governed the disposition of
renewal term rights regardless of any bequests of copyrights in the author's
Will. Even if the author had more than sufficiently provided for the spouse
and children with non-copyright assets, the copyright law diverted all rights
back to the statutory class. Accordingly, an author who died during the initial
term of copyright could neither contract away nor bequest away his or her
statutory successor class of heirs' rights to the renewal term of a copyright.
In effect, Congress created a federally mandated, or forced, estate plan for
copyright renewal rights similar to the concept of forced heirship. °2
199. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 2, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (repealed 1870).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Will-bumping's effect of limiting an author's testamentary freedom not only
ignores an author's clear testamentary intent, it potentially creates federal transfer tax
problems involving inter-vivos gifts and the marital or charitable deductions. For example, as
a result of copyright law, a surviving spouse may only have a terminal interest in a copyright.
In addition, an inter-vivos gift to charity of copyright may be disqualified as a split interest
gift. These implications, however, are outside the scope of this Article.
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b. Will-Bumping Scenarios
Will-bumping is a clear example of how copyright law interferes with
the testamentary freedom of an author. Copyright law has the ability of
nullifying an author's dispositions of property during life and at death.
Understanding Will-bumping helps clarify exactly how and when copyright
law restricts testamentary freedom. Therefore, a more detailed review of two
common Will-bumping scenarios is in order.
i. Devise to Non-Statutory Heir
A common scenario is the situation where an author devises by Will his
or her copyright interests to an individual or entity other than a member of
the statutory class of successor heirs. For example, Sam, a bio-technology
engineer who owned multiple copyright interests in works he created, was
married to Sue. After amassing substantial wealth, Sam died, bequeathing all
of his copyright interests to a charitable organization for needy and sick
children and leaving the remainder of his large estate (consisting of non-
copyright interests) to his wife, Sue. Sam and Sue had no children.
Under this scenario, copyright law clearly collides with Sam's
testamentary freedom, by frustrating his testamentary intent and destroying
his estate plan. °3 Even though the charity will be the owner of the various
copyright interests until the initial term expires, the copyright interests will
vest in the statutory class of heirs after the initial term. Accordingly, the
renewal system bumps Sam's Will and the charitable organization's
ownership of the copyright interests. Copyright law causes the renewal term
interests to pass to Sue instead. If Sam had lived through the initial term,
Sam's Will would have governed the disposition of the copyright interests
for the renewal term and (i) Sam's testamentary intent would have been
realized, (ii) the charity would have benefited, and (iii) Sue would have been
adequately provided for by the remainder of Sam's large estate.2°
203. The same outcome would result if Sam had transferred by gift his copyright
interests to the charitable foundation during his lifetime, but did not survive the initial term.
204. In the case of Saroyan v. William Saroyan Foundation, 675 F. Supp. 843
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), involving a copyright ownership dispute between a testamentary beneficiary
of copyright interests and the statutory successor class of heirs, id. at 843, the court held that
the federal copyright code mandated non-discretionary uniform treatment of the renewal
provisions, id. at 845. In Saroyan, the decedent, William Saroyan, had bequeathed "all
copyrights, rights to copyright and literary property in published or unpublished work" to the
William Saroyan Foundation (a charitable trust benefiting charitable and educational
activities). Id. at 843. After the expiration of the initial term, however, Saroyan's estranged
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ii. Devise to Statutory Heirs
The second scenario applies where an author devises copyright interests
to a member or members of the successor class of heirs, but allocates the
copyright interests in proportions different than mandated by the renewal
system (or excludes some of the members of the successor class of heirs
altogether while providing for others). For example, Sam has substantial
wealth consisting of copyrights. Sam is married to Sue, and they have two
adult children. Sam's Will devises all of his copyright interests to Sue for
life, and remainder to his children. Sam dies and is survived by Sue and their
two adult children.
Under this scenario, copyright law severely restricts the effectiveness of
Sam's bequest of the larger portion of copyright interests to his wife, Sue.
Sam might have legitimate reasons why he may want to financially benefit
his wife over his children. However, this disposition conflicts with the way
courts have interpreted the proportions to which members of the statutory
class of heirs are entitled.
In general, authors may wish to differentiate within the successor class of
heirs because of the various needs or other variables of the members of the
class. For example, authors may wish to leave a larger share of their
copyright interests to a surviving spouse and a smaller share to their children.
Or, if an author is not survived by a spouse, the author may wish to leave a
larger portion of copyright interests to a special needs child or a smaller
portion to a financially sound child. The renewal provision, however,
restricts the testamentary freedom of authors who may want to leave their
renewal term interests to a member of the statutory class of heirs in different
proportions.
Although copyright law is clear concerning the identity of the members
of the statutory successor class of heirs, copyright law is less clear
concerning how to apportion the copyright renewal interests among these
members. Recall that the members of the statutory successor class of heirs
who have the highest renewal priority are the author's widow or widower,
children moved to renew the copyright of the work The Cave Dwellers, thereby "bumping"
the bequest to the charitable foundation. Id. at 844. The foundation challenged the renewal,
claiming that the children's estrangement from their father and Saroyan's clear testamentary
intent foreclosed the children's claim to the renewal term interests. Id. The court, however,
held that there was nothing in the language or structure of the renewal provisions to provide a
basis for denying rights to an author's statutory successor class of heirs. Id. at 845.
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 38 Rutgers L.J. 153 2006-2007
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
child or children. There is no guidance concerning how to apportion renewal
rights among this class of heirs.2°5
The 1831 Act accomplished Congress's goal of preventing a work from
inadvertently falling into the public domain at the end of a copyright's initial
term by creating a statutory class of renewal successors. The legislative
history concerning the 1831 Act seems to indicate that Congress was trying
to protect surviving family members in the event an author died during the
initial term.206 The silence in the legislative history, however, concerning the
statute's restrictions on testamentary freedom indicates that Congress did not
understand the impact of the revised renewal system on testamentary
freedom. 207 Regardless of congressional intent in 1831, the conflict between
copyright law and testamentary freedom slipped into American copyright
law.
4. The Copyright Act of 1909
Criticism of the renewal system led to the next major revision to the
copyright code in 1909 (the "1909 Act").20 8 This criticism of the renewal
system fell into two categories. 209 First, it seemed unfair that a work would
205. This problem was manifested in De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956), a
copyright ownership dispute between an author's surviving spouse and the author's
illegitimate child, id. at 572. In De Sylva, the Court had to decide whether "widow, widower,
or children" constituted one class or two classes. Id. at 573-74. The widow of the decedent
(songwriter George De Sylva) routinely renewed each of the copyright interests in the
decedent's work as they became due. Id. at 572. Stephen Ballentine, the decedent's
illegitimate son, sued for his share in the renewal terms of the decedent's works. Id. The
widow did not dispute whether Ballentine was the decedent's son, but contended that
Ballentine had no right to share in the renewal terms. Id. at 573. One argument proffered by
the widow was that an author's "widow" constitutes a separate and distinct successor class of
heirs with priority over the author's "children," which in itself is a separate and distinct class.
Id. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the author's "widow, widower, or children" was
a single class of successor heirs. Id. at 580; id. at 584 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Supreme
Court expressly declined to opine about the proper allocation among the members of a
successor class of heirs that consists of both a surviving spouse and children (e.g., equal
shares to each member of the class as tenants in common, division of shares based on
individual states' intestate law, one-half to the widow and one-half in equal shares to the
children, or a life estate in the widow with the remainder interest to the children in equal
shares). Id. at 582. Interestingly, there was no discussion in the opinion concerning to whom
the decedent bequeathed his copyright interests in his Will.
206. See id. at 582.
207. See id.
208. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976).
209. For a discussion of the history of these debates, see Barbara A. Ringer, Renewal
of Copyright, in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503, 508-11 (Arthur Fisher Memorial ed. 1963).
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fall into the public domain at the end of the initial term if an author died
during the initial term without a surviving spouse or child.21 ° Second, the
provisions governing the inter-vivos transfers of renewal term rights during
the initial term were unclear (i.e., whether the renewal provisions bumped an
author's inter-vivos assignment of renewal term rights). 21 Thus, Congress
set out to address these concerns.
Initially, Congress considered abolishing the renewal system in favor of
a unitary copyright term.21 2 After several vastly different bills were proposed,
however, Congress settled on the concept that authors would be financially
burdened, while the publishing community would be greatly benefited, if the
renewal system and its contract-bumping features were abolished.213
Therefore, the 1909 Act retained the two-term renewal system.214
The 1909 Act remedied the first criticism about the previous act-that
the work fell into the public domain at the end of the initial term if the author
died during the initial term without spouse or children-by expanding the
mandated class of statutory heirs.215 The 1909 Act stated that a copyright
could only be renewed "by the author of such work if still living, or the
widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living, or if
such author, widow, widower, or children be not living, then by the author's
executors, or in the absence of a [W]ill, his next of kin.",2 16 This provision
210. Id. at 508.
211. Id. at 509.
212. Id.
213. As one commentator noted,
The second term of fourteen years to the author or to his widow or children is always
a distinct and important advantage to him, and never a disadvantage, because if the
author has made an improvident bargain with his publisher for the first term, its
disadvantages may be redressed by the bargain for the second term with a surer
knowledge of the selling value of the work. The proposed law altogether omits this
salutary provision, and under it the publisher will acquire, and the author will forever
part with, the entire interest in the work not only for the contingent term during life
but also for the absolute term of thirty years from his death, unless the author reserves
to himself the ownership of the copyright, which rarely happens.
WM. A. JENNER, THE PUBLISHER AGAINST THE PEOPLE: A PLEA FOR THE DEFENSE 61 (1907).
214. The 1909 Act granted authors an initial copyright term that lasted twenty-eight
years from the date of first publication but extended the renewal term to twenty-eight years if
the copyright owner renewed in a timely fashion. Rosenbloum, supra note 14, at 169. Whether
the work was ever published had an effect on copyright protection duration as did the date of
the first publication, if any, since copyright protection was previously keyed to publication
rather than creation of a work.
215. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81 (repealed 1976).
216. Id.
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built in the general idea found under the 1831 Act that a work should not
pass into the public domain if the author dies during a work's initial term,
assuming appropriate successors were available.21 7 The 1909 Act improved
on the 1831 Act, however, by including the author's executor or next of kin
in the statutory successor class.21 8 As a result, if the author died during the
initial term of a work, the renewal term rights would pass to someone in the
statutory successor class in any situation.
Even though the 1909 Act granted that a "copyright secured under this or
previous Acts of the United States may be assigned, granted, or mortgaged
by an instrument in writing signed by the proprietor of the copyright, or may
be bequeathed by [Wlill," the 1909 Act did not assure the copyright owner
complete freedom of testation over the bequest. 219 For example, if an author
died during the initial term survived by a spouse and a child from a previous
marriage, and the author bequeathed his copyright interests to his child from
the previous marriage and provided for his surviving spouse out of his non-
copyright assets, the 1909 Act still would govern the disposition of renewal
term rights in the copyright interest-not the author's Will. Thus, the
statutorily mandated successor class bumped the intent of the author's Will,
thereby furthering the "Will-bumping" phenomenon under copyright law.22°
As for the second criticism of the previous act-concerning the
implications of an inter-vivos assignment of renewal term rights during the
initial term-the legislative history suggests that Congress thought it was
precluding the author, during the initial term, from any power to convey or
waive renewal rights.221 Congress intended for an author to have the ability
to bump any assignment of copyright interests made during the initial term
(i.e., contract bumping). The American courts would have served the purpose
well had they held that an author could not transfer or waive renewal rights
during the initial term.222 However, in Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark
& Sons,223 a case involving the renewal term rights in the song "When Irish
Eyes Are Smiling," the Supreme Court held that the renewal term rights
could be transferred inter-vivos during the initial term.224 In essense, the
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. § 42, 35 Stat. at 1084.
220. It seems ironic that Congress would specifically grant an author the freedom to
transfer by Will, yet codify restrictions that severely undermine the effectiveness of the
author's Will.
221. Nevins, Magic Kingdom, supra note 14, at 92.
222. Nevins, Little Copyright Dispute, supra note 14, at 921.
223, 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
224. Id. at 657-59.
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Court had interpreted the 1909 Act in a similar way as the 1831 Act was
interpreted in Paige v. Banks225-that an author did have the right, during the
initial term, to assign renewal term rights and be bound by the assignment. 226
5. The Copyright Act of 1976
When Congress adopted the Copyright Act of 1976 (the "1976
Act") 227-the current copyright statute-again there was considerable debate
over the renewal system. 228 In deliberating the renewal provisions under the
1976 Act, Congress noted, "One of the worst features of the present
copyright law is the provision for renewal of copyright. A substantial burden
and expense, this unclear and highly technical requirement results in
incalculable amounts of unproductive work. In a number of cases it is the
cause of inadvertent and unjust loss of copyright.' 229 As a result, Congress
passed the 1976 Act, a comprehensive new statute with the adoption of a
new copyright duration.
a. The Death of Will-Bumping
Under the 1976 Act, the renewal system still applies for pre-1978
works, 230 in that section 304 of the 1976 Act carries over the two-term
renewal system for works created before January 1, 1978.231 In addition, the
1976 Act maintains the same procedures 232 for renewal rights as were found
225. 80 U.S. 608, 614-15 (1871).
226. See Fred Fisher, 318 U.S. at 657-59.
227. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2000), and in scattered sections of other titles of the U.S.C.).
228. Congress stated that the adoption of a new copyright duration was "by far" the
most important goal in copyright revision. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 133 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5749.
229. Id. at 134, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5750.
230. Congress did not replace the two-term system for works created prior to 1978
because to do so would have possibly impaired the obligations and expectations under existing
contracts.
231. The 1976 Act, however, increased the renewal term to forty-seven years. Pub. L.
No. 94-553, § 304, 90 Stat. at 2573.
232. In fact, renewal procedures remained relatively the same until 1992. Before 1992,
an individual had to follow certain procedural requirements to renew a copyright for its
renewal term. If the individual failed to register to renew the copyright, the copyright expired
and entered the public domain after the expiration of the initial term. The Copyright Renewal
Act of 1992 (the "Renewal Act") eliminated this procedural hurdle. Pub. L. No. 102-307, tit. I,
§ 102(a), 106 Stat. 264, 264-66 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2000)). Under the
Renewal Act, renewal registration is no longer necessary for the extension of copyright.
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in the 1909 Act, including the provision that granted the renewal rights only
to the author, if living, or, if not living, to the statutorily mandated successor
class. 233 Accordingly, the Will-bumping phenomenon continues for pre-
January 1, 1978 works.
The renewal system only applies to works in their initial term on January
1, 1978-works copyrighted as early as January 1, 1950 (1978 - 28 year
initial term = 1950). For practical purposes, however, the renewal system
currently applies only to works created from 1976 through December 31,
1977 (i.e., works created pre-1978 that are currently in their initial 28 year
term). Section 304(a) applies to any transfer of renewal rights including
transfers to third party licensees for adequate and full consideration and any
Rather, the renewal of works in their first term as of January 1, 1992 is automatic.
Accordingly, for works published and copyrighted between January 1, 1964 and December
31, 1977, "an application [for renewal] is not a condition of the renewal and extension of the
copyright in a work for a further term" (i.e., works copyrighted pre-1964 are not subject to the
automatic renewal provisions). Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 § 102(a), 106 Stat. at 265.
Likewise, if the author dies during the work's initial term, the renewal rights automatically
vest in the statutory successor class of heirs when the initial term expires.
233. Section 304 provides, in relevant part:
(a) Copyrights in Their First Term on January 1, 1978.
(1)(A) Any copyright, the first term of which is subsisting on January 1, 1978, shall
endure for 28 years from the date it was originally secured.
(B) In the case of-
(i) any posthumous work or of any periodical, cyclopedic, or other composite
work upon which the copyright was originally secured by the proprietor
thereof, or
(ii) any work copyrighted by a corporate body (otherwise than as assignee or
licensee of the individual author) or by an employer for whom such work is
made for hire,
the proprietor of such copyright shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of
the copyright in such work for the further term of 67 years.
(C) In the case of any other copyrighted work, including a contribution by an
individual author to a periodical or to a cyclopedic or other composite work-
(i) the author of such work, if the author is still living,
(ii) the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author is not living,
(iii) the author's executors, if such author, widow, widower, or children are
not living, or
(iv) the author's next of kin, in the absence of a will of the author,
shall be entitled to a renewal and extension of the copyright in such work for a
further term of 67 years.
17 U.S.C. § 304 (2000).
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donative transfers for estate planning purposes, including later transfers by
an author's heirs.234
Although the 1976 Act carries over the renewal system for pre-1978
works, the limitations on testamentary freedom caused by the renewal system
are quickly drawing to a close. As noted earlier, Will-bumping occurs only
for pre-1978 works in which the renewal rights have not vested in the author.
Accordingly, "(a) ...the last possible publication date for a work coming
under the [renewal system] was December 31, 1977, (b) ... the initial term
of copyright protection .. . last[s] for twenty-eight years, [which was
December 31, 2005 (end of 1977 + 28 years)] and (c) ...the statute of
limitations [for claims concerning renewal term interests] extends for three
years., 235 Therefore, it seems that Will-bumping will cease to be a problem
on December 31, 2008.236
However, this is not cause for complete celebration. Will-bumping is just
one testamentary problem posed by copyright law, despite commentator's
opinions to the contrary. In fact, commentators seem to believe that after
2008 there will be no conflict between copyright law and testamentary
freedom at all. For instance, one commentator has stated that "[iun 2005, all
works ... will have entered their renewal term, and thus authors will have
complete testamentary control over the disposition of their copyright
interests.237 Another commentator has noted that "[tlhe days of copyright
law's meddling with authors' testamentary freedom are drawing to a
close. 238
Because copyright commentators maintain that the conflict between the
copyright law and testamentary freedom has been resolved, a false sense of
security has arisen, perhaps exasperating the significance of the conflicts that
remain. Copyright commentators have long expounded that estate-planning
practitioners were unfamiliar with copyright law to the detriment of creative
individuals. Ironically, it is now the copyright commentators' unfamiliarity
with current estate-planning techniques that may be causing problems for
creative persons. If copyright commentators are free from concern over
testamentary intents of the authors, and estate planners are unfamiliar with
234. See KELLER & CUNARD, supra note 148, § 7:4.2, at 7-15.
235. Nevins, Little Copyright Dispute, supra note 14, at 930.
236. Id.
237. Rosenbloum, supra note 14, at 188-89.
238. Nivens, Little Copyright Dispute, supra note 14, at 931; see also Nivens, Magic
Kingdom, supra note 14, at 114 ("[A]t the close of business on December 31, 2005 ... the
window of vulnerability will have shut tight and the will-bumping phenomenon will have
faded forever into history.").
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the copyright code, both communities will be in for a surprise in 2013 when
terminations first become effective and the era of "estate-bumping" begins.
b. The Birth of Estate-Bumping
The 1976 Act abandoned the two-term renewal system altogether as to
works created on or after January 1, 1978 and replaced it with an extended
single term of copyright protections based on the life of the author.239
Generally, for works created after January 1, 1978, copyright protection lasts
the entire life of the author plus an additional seventy years. 240
Another revision to copyright law concerned the transferability of
indivisible exclusive rights under the copyright law. While, under the 1909
Act, a copyright was indivisible-meaning that a copyright owner could not
transfer to any particular individual exclusive right without transferring all of
the exclusive rights granted to a copyright owner2n1-the 1976 Act provides
that a copyright may be transferred "in whole or in part., 242 Specifically,
"[a]ny of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright . . . may be
transferred . . . and owned separately,' 243 and these rights "may be
transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation
of law, and may be bequeathed by [W]iH or pass as personal property by the
applicable laws of intestate succession.2 Section 301 of the 1976 Act also
provides that federal copyright law preempts pertinent state law.245 The
legislative history states that the purpose of this provision "is to preempt and
abolish any rights under the common law or statutes of a State that are
239. Congress stated that one reason for the change was that life expectancy had
dramatically risen between 1909 and 1976 and many authors would live to see the end of their
copyright monopoly. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 134 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5750.
240. The major exception to this general rule is for works made for hire (generally,
works made by an employee), which last for a term of 95 years from the date of publication of
the work, or 120 years from its creation date, whichever expires first. Originally, the 1976 Act
limited the duration to life plus 50 years; however, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act (the "Sonny Bono Act") extended this to life plus 70 years. Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. I, §
102, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000)).
241. Rosenbloum, supra note 14, at 172.
242. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1).
243. Id. § 201(d)(2).
244. Id. § 201(d)(1).
245. Id. § 301.
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equivalent to copyright and that extend to works coming with the scope of
the Federal copyright law."
246
The most important revision to copyright law, however, is that the 1976
Act grants authors and their statutory successors the non-waivable right to
terminate previous copyright assignments after the lapse of a prescribed
period of time in order to recapture any remaining value in the copyright
interest (i.e., to provide an escape mechanism for authors who assigned away
their copyright interests before the full value of the interest was apparent).247
Even though Congress was eliminating the two-term system in favor of a
single-term system, Congress wanted to preserve the unique reversionary
rights of authors. Congress still recognized the need of "safeguarding authors
against unremunerative transfers. . . . because of the unequal bargaining
position of authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a
work's value until it has been exploited. 248 The renewal structure, however,
was found to be an unsatisfactory means of achieving reversion for
authors.249 Rather than granting renewal rights by terminating an original
copyright term to be followed by a second legally separate and independent
term, reversion now occurs by granting authors, or their statutory successor
class of heirs, the unwaivable right to terminate prior assignments during the
sole copyright term250 in order to recapture any remaining value of the work.
Thus, the termination provisions under the 1976 Act constitute an attempt at
granting reversionary rights to authors while trying to improve upon the
problems of the renewal provisions.25'
246. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 130 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5746. Due to the preemption clause, one could argue that there is no conflict between federal
copyright law and individual states estates law. But see Rosenbloum, supra note 14, at 175
("Estates law does not fall into the category of those laws preempted by section 301 because
[estates law] does not offer protection equivalent to copyright." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
247. For a general discussion concerning the termination rights provisions, see Frank
R. Curtis, Caveat Emptor in Copyright: A Practical Guide to the Termination-of-Transfers
Provisions of the New Copyright Code, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 19 (1977); Marc
R. Stein, Termination of Transfers and Licenses Under the New Copyright Act: Thorny
Problems for the Copyright Bar, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1141 (1977).
248. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740.
249. See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 169, § 9.03, at 9-32. The renewal
system was clumsy and difficult. In addition, it created a possibility that works would
inadvertently fall into the public domain by failing to renew. Finally, it was weakened by
Supreme Court decisions recognizing the validity of assignments of renewal rights prior to
their vesting.
250. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5).
251. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 169, § 11.01 [A], at 11-3 to 11-4.
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The termination rights provisions are found under sections 203 and
304(c) of the 1976 Act.252 Section 203 governs transfers made on or after
January 1, 1978, while section 304(c) governs transfers before that date. 53
More specifically, for transfers executed on or after January 1, 1978, authors
have an unwaivable right to terminate the transfer and recover the interest
during a five-year window of opportunity that begins thirty-five years from
the execution of the transfer.254 In other words, thirty-five years after a
copyright assignment, an author can terminate that assignment and retake the
interest. For transfers executed before January 1, 1978, authors have an
unwaivable right to terminate the transfer and recover any interest during a
five-year window of opportunity that begins fifty-six years after the work
was copyrighted. 55
Termination rights attach to all assignments except those effectuated by
an author's Will.256 Accordingly, termination provisions govern transfers of
not only ownership interests, but also of any "transfer" of copyright,
257
including any exclusive and nonexclusive licenses of copyright2 58 or any
252. For the most part, the termination rights provisions under sections 203 and 304(c)
overlap. Hence, the discussion will be applicable to transfers under both sections 203 and
304(c), unless otherwise noted.
253. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 203, with § 304.
254. Id. § 203(a)(3) ("[I]f the grant covers the right of publication of the work, the
period begins at the end of thirty-five years from the date of publication of the work under the
grant or at the end of forty years from the date of execution of the grant, whichever term ends
earlier."); see Walthal v. Rusk, 172 F.3d 481, 483-84 (7th Cir. 1999) (considering whether
transfers that are both unspecified in duration and silent as to termination are covered by
section 203). In Walthal, the Butthole Surfers, a progressive musical band, orally transferred
the nonexclusive right to manufacture and distribute its recordings to Touch and Go Records.
Walthal, 172 F.3d at 482. The Butthole Surfers later terminated the agreement. Id. at 482-83.
Because a contract of unspecified length is terminable at will under Illinois law, Touch and
Go argued that section 203 preempted state contract law on this issue and created a minimum
thirty-five year period for any transfer of copyrights. Id. at 483. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit rejected this contention, noting that is not in keeping with the pro-author
policy behind the termination provisions. Id. at 484.
255. 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(3).
256. Termination rights, however, do not apply to works made for hire. See id. §
203(a). In addition, a derivative work owner maintains the copyright interests even after a
termination of the copyright transfer takes place. Paula Lindsey Wilson, Rejection of the New
Property Right Theory as Viewed Through the Rear Window: Stewart v. Abend, 24
CREIGHTON L. REv. 155, 173-75 (1990).
257. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c). A "transfer of copyright ownership" is defined by
the 1976 Act to include any "conveyance" or "alienation." Id. § 101 (amended 2005). This
includes gifts causa mortis-a gift in contemplation of imminent death-and inter vivos-a
gift during the lifetime of the donor.
258. See id. § 101.
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right comprised in a copyright. 259 Unlike renewal rights, termination rights
are non-waivable and non-assignable, which completely preserves the
concept of contract-bumping. 26° "Not even a specific, well [drafted contract]
by an author to forgo the termination right is binding on [the author]. 26'
Similar to the renewal system, the termination rights provisions prescribe
a non-discretionary hierarchy of individuals who are entitled to terminate
previously transferred copyright interests in the event that the author does not
survive until the vesting date.262 If the author survives to the vesting of the
Non-exclusive grants were included in the right [of termination] on the strength of the
argument that, otherwise, there would be nothing to prevent a transferee from
avoiding the effect of the provision by compelling the author to grant him a perpetual
non-exclusive license along with a statutorily limited transfer of exclusive rights.
KELLER & CUNARD, supra note 148, § 7:5.2, at 7-22 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
259. See Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1320, 1324
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 636 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1980) (unpublished table decision).
260. KELLER & CUNARD, supra note 148, § 7:5.2[A], at 7-22.
261. Bartow, supra note 11, at 402.
262. Section 203 of the United States Code, provides, in relevant part:
(a) Conditions for Termination.-In the case of any work other than a work made for
hire, the exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of
any right under a copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978,
otherwise than by will, is subject to termination under the following conditions:
(1) In the case of a grant executed by one author, termination of the grant may be
effected by that author or, if the author is dead, by the person or persons who,
under clause (2) of this subsection, own and are entitled to exercise a total of
more than one-half of that author's termination interest....
(2) Where an author is dead, his or her termination interest is owned, and may be
exercised, as follows:
(A) The widow or widower owns the author's entire termination interest unless
there are any surviving children or grandchildren of the author, in which case
the widow or widower owns one-half of the author's interest.
(B) The author's surviving children, and the surviving children of any dead child
of the author, own the author's entire termination interest unless there is a
widow or widower, in which case the ownership of one-half of the author's
interest is divided among them.
(C) The rights of the author's children and grandchildren are in all cases divided
among them and exercised on a per stirpes basis according to the number of
such author's children represented; the share of the children of a dead child
in a termination interest can be exercised only by the action of a majority of
them.
(D) In the event that the author's widow or widower, children, and grandchildren
are not living, the author's executor, administrator, personal representative,
or trustee shall own the author's entire termination interest.
17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1)-(2) (2000 & Supp. 2002) (footnote omitted).
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termination right, he or she has the right to the reversion of the assigned
interest.263 If the author dies prior to vesting of the termination rights, the
right to terminate passes to the author's statutory class of successor heirs, as
does the right to the reversionary interest.2 4
Ownership rights do not vest at the commencement of the termination
period, but rather when timely notice is served on an assignee,265 which can
occur up to ten years before commencement of the termination period.266 The
actual copyright interests themselves, though, do not revert to the author (or
the statutory heirs) until the applicable termination date.26 7 A properly
effectuated termination restores ownership of a copyright to all those who
possessed termination rights as of the date the notice of termination was
filed. Therefore, if an author serves a notice of termination, but dies prior to
the applicable termination date, the copyright will pass to the author's estate,
not to the statutory successor class of heirs. 68 If the author survives to a date
at which he or she could serve a termination notice, but dies without serving
one, the statutory successors, and not the estate, gain the right to serve such a
notice and take the reversion at the applicable termination date. After the
actual termination date, an author is (or the statutory heirs are) then free to
commercially exploit the copyright or transfer it to others.
Generally, the author's statutory successor class of heirs consists of the
author's widow or widower, children, and grandchildren, if there are any,
and executors, administrators, or trustees if there are not.269 If the author dies
263. Id. §§ 203(a)(1), 304(c)(1) (2000).
264. Id.
265. To effectuate a termination of previously transferred copyrights, proper
notification is required as dictated by both the copyright statute and the Register of
Copyrights. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(4)(B), 304(c)-(d) (2000 & Supp. 2002); 37 C.F.R. § 201.10
(2005). If the proper notification is not made during the mandated term, the author will lose
the ability to recapture the copyright that had been granted. 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(6) (2000).
266. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4)(A). Basically, written notice of termination must be served
upon the grantee or the grantee's successor in title two to ten years before the effective date of
the termination set forth in the notice. A copy of the notice also must be recorded in the
Copyright Office before the effective date of termination. Id.
267. Id. §§ 203(b)(2), 304(c)(6)(B).
268. Bourne Co. v. MPL Commc'ns, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 859, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(stating that vested rights under a terminated grant passed to the author's estate when the
author died after notice of termination had been served but before rights under the terminated
grant reverted), modified and amended by 678 F. Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
269. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2002).
[Vol. 38:109
HeinOnline  -- 38 Rutgers L.J. 164 2006-2007
LIBERATING ESTATES LAW
leaving only a surviving spouse270 (and no children or grandchildren), the
surviving spouse owns the author's entire termination interest.271 If the
author dies leaving only children or grandchildren27 2 (and no surviving
spouse), the author's entire termination interest is divided among his or her
children and grandchildren on a per stirpetal basis (which means an equal
share for each child, with a deceased child's equal share being divided
among the deceased child's descendants).273 The interest of a dead child can
be executed only by majority action of his surviving children.274 If the author
dies leaving both a surviving spouse and children or grandchildren, the
surviving spouse owns one-half of the author's termination interest, and the
remaining one-half interest is divided among the author's children and
grandchildren on a per stirpetal basis.275 Finally, if the author dies leaving no
surviving spouse, children or grandchildren, the termination right vests in the
276
author's executor, administrator, personal representative or trustee.2 6 Where
there is more than one statutory heir, the termination right is divided and
277
apportioned among the statutory heirs by statute.
The exercise of a termination right requires agreement by statutory heirs
who own more than half of the termination interest. 278 Therefore, if the
author is survived by a spouse and children, because a surviving spouse only
owns one-half of the author's termination interest, the surviving spouse must
270. "The author's 'widow' or 'widower' is the author's surviving spouse under the
law of the author's domicile at the time of his or her death, whether or not the spouse has later
remarried." Id. § 101 (2000) (amended 2005) (emphasis added).
271. Id. § 203(a)(2)(A) (Supp. 2002).
272. The statute defines "grandchildren" as the "surviving children of any dead child
of the author." Id. § 203(a)(2)(B).
273. Id. § 203(a)(2)(B)-(C).
274. Id. § 203(a)(2)(C); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 125 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5741.
275. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(B)-(C).
The House Report provides the following example of how per stirpes
representation works: An author dies, leaving a widow, two living children and three
grandchildren by a third child, now dead. The widow . . . takes 50% of the
termination right. The two living children each take 16%% (50% divided by three),
and the three grandchildren each take approximately 5/2% (16% divided by three). In
order to terminate the author's inter vivos grants, the widow and at least one of the
children or two of the grandchildren must act (the grandchildren's collective 16%%
interest can be exercised only if a majority of them consent).
KELLER & CUNARD, supra note 148, § 7:5.2[B], at 7-23; see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at
125-26, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5741.
276. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)(D) (2000).
277. Id. § 203(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2002).
278. Id. § 203(a)(1) (2000).
2006]
HeinOnline  -- 38 Rutgers L.J. 165 2006-2007
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
join with at least one child in order to effectuate a termination. If the author
is only survived by children, then a majority of these children must join in a
termination. So, if there were only two statutory heirs, each can disrupt the
other's plans for termination. 279 Thus, this mandated hierarchy could
encourage manipulation and strategic behavior on the part of the statutory
heirs for either emotional or financial reasons.
Unique to termination rights is the ability of an author to pass copyright
interests to anyone by Will without the possibility of having the bequest
bumped by statutory heirs.28° In other words, unlike the renewal system,
termination rights do not apply to transfers by Will. The only type of
copyright transfer that cannot be terminated by the author's statutory heirs is
one that a deceased author executed by Will.
Similar to renewal rights, though, the author cannot strip members of the
statutory class of heirs of termination rights or alter the size of the interest
that vests in any particular statutory heir. In other words, an author cannot
redistribute termination interests among her statutory heirs. As a result, any
inter vivos assignment (even a donative assignment) that an author makes
can be terminated by her statutory heirs if the author does not live long
enough to exercise or ignore termination rights.
Under section 203(a)(5) of the 1976 Act, licenses and transfers of
copyrights executed after January 1, 1978, began to vest in 2003 (for grants
made in 1978) and the first wave of actual terminations under this statutory
provision can be expected to occur in 2013 (1978 + 35 years). Notice of
termination for works created in 1978 could have already begun as early as
2003.281
Obviously, Congress was trying to alleviate some of the problems
associated with Will-bumping under the 1976 Act.282 In fact, some scholars
argue that disallowing termination of transfers made by Will maintains the
279. Bartow, supra note 11, at 403.
280. 17 U.S.C. 203(a) (2000 & Supp. 2002).
281. The 1976 Act was modified again under the Sonny Bono Act by extending by
twenty years the various copyright terms that had been adopted under the 1976 Act. Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. I, § 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827,
2827 (1998) (amending 17 U.S.C. § 302). In addition, the Sonny Bono Act revised the 1976
Act by providing that, where the time for terminating an assignment of copyright had passed,
an author would have a new opportunity to terminate and claim the rights of the additional
twenty years added by this Act. Id. § 102(d)(1)(D), 112 Stat. at 2828 (amending 17 U.S.C. §
304). Also, the Sonny Bono Act expands the statutory successor class of heirs under the
termination right provisions to include administrators, personal representatives, and trustees.
Id. § 103, 112 Stat. at 2829 (amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(2), 304(c)(2)).
282. See generally supra Section II.B.5.
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benefit of contract-bumping while bypassing the detriments of Will-
bumping. These scholars, however, ignore contemporary estate planning
techniques and testamentary tools. In fact, the conflict between copyright law
and testamentary freedom continues under the 1976 Act because of the
practical implications of the termination rights provisions. The difference
between termination rights and renewal rights is that transfers made by
Will-and Will alone-may never be terminated, but all other transfers are
potentially subject to being bumped. Because inter vivos donative transfers
can be nullified by an author's statutory successor class of heirs, an author's
testamentary freedom is severely limited and the author's overall estate plan
is subject to being bumped by unintended beneficiaries. Although the
bumping would not apply to Wills per se, the bumping could nevertheless
undermine an author's estate plan. If the author dies before the termination
right becomes exercisable, it remains copyright law rather than the author's
testamentary intent that determines who has the right to terminate and profit
from his creative endeavors. Accordingly, I have dubbed this problem
"estate-bumping." 283
IV. THE BASIC PROBLEMS WITH ESTATE-BUMPING
There are several inherent problems with termination rights. First and
foremost (for purposes of this article), termination rights severely curtail
testamentary freedom and have the potential of undermining an otherwise
well-crafted estate plan. Second, the revisions under the 1976 Act render
ineffective the purpose behind the creation of the statutory heirs system.
Third, termination rights are inefficient and duplicative of family protections
provided under state law, which could potentially devalue copyright
interests. Finally, termination rights are possibly unconstitutional.
A. Conflicts with Testamentary Freedom
The idea that copyright law no longer conflicts with testamentary
freedom is dead wrong.28 Copyright commentators who believe "[t]he days
of copyright law's meddling with authors' testamentary freedom are drawing
to a close ' 285 ignore the nature and practice of modem estate planning. In
fact, copyright law still dramatically interferes with an author's testamentary
283. A new concept that builds upon Professor Nevins' work on Will-bumping.
284. Pardon the pun.
285. Nevins, Little Copyright Dispute, supra note 14, at 931.
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freedom. The fact that termination rights do not apply to transfers executed
"by Will" does not mean there is no longer a conflict between the copyright
law and testamentary freedom. The copyright code fails to carve-out similar
exceptions for other types of transfers which have testamentary effect, such
as Will-substitutes 286 and other modem estate planning mechanisms, which
have become the predominate estate planning tools in the United States.
In many jurisdictions, the same risks of bumping a testamentary plan will
continue under the system of termination rights as it did under the renewal
system. As discussed earlier,287 testamentary freedom is simply not the right
to leave property by Will, but is the right to choose who receives your
property, control the nature of the transfer, determine the timing of the
transfer, and decide other aspects effectuating an individual's testamentary
intent. Similar to the problems of Will-bumping under the renewal system,
termination rights have the potential to nullify estate plans, which would be
otherwise completely unobjectionable on any sound policy basis, because
termination rights have the potential to undermine the author's testamentary
intent.288 Because of the nature of termination rights, authors are now
precluded from using the most efficient and effective estate planning
techniques, controlling the timing and nature of their donative transfers, and,
286. As noted earlier in Section II.A of this Article, far more property passes by Will-
substitutes than by Will in the United States. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 19, at 9; see also
VOL.LMAR Er AL., supra note 4, at 111 (proposing that the dramatic rise in the usage of will-
substitutes in the twentieth century is due to the public perception that will-substitutes are "a
convenient and inexpensive alternative to lawyers, wills, and probate"). See generally John H.
Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARv. L.
REV. 1108, 1109-15 (1984) (discussing the rise of Will-substitutes).
287. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
288. Sadly, Congress seems completely deferential concerning an author's
testamentary intent. As one court stated in the context of the termination rights provisions,
these provisions are:
[Niot necessarily... for the effectuation of the author's "intent." If the author's intent
were the paramount concern of the statute, then no termination of any kind would be
allowed, because most authors presumably "intend" to make the assignment that is
the very object of... [the] termination provisions. Thus, there is a limit on the weight
that courts should attach to the author's subjective desires, and it is in this sense that
the "otherwise than by will" language should be understood. Granting supremacy to
the author's intent as against the rights of the widow and children would obviate the
reason that Section 304(c) is in the Copyright Act to begin with and distort the
deliberate legislative choice made by Congress, unless the grant of copyright
renewals was made by [W]ill in the first instance.
Larry Spier, Inc. v. Bourne Co., 953 F.2d 774, 778 (2d Cir. 1992).
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in many circumstances, are practically limited to whom they can transfer
their copyright interests.
289
Because estate-planning practitioners are unaware how the copyright law
creates a federal incursion on testamentary freedom, and because some
copyright commentators seem to believe that the bumping aspects of the
copyright law have been significantly reduced, there is a greater potential of
the copyright law "bumping" an author's carefully prepared estate plans,
perhaps leaving estate-planning practitioners open to claims of malpractice.
Estate-bumping can occur when termination rights circumvent dispositive
estate planning instruments (other than Wills). Termination rights can restrict
copyright authors from using the most tax advantaged estate planning
techniques by prohibiting the author from determining the timing and the
character of the transfer, and precluding the author from using family
holding companies and partnerships as part of their estate plan. If estate-
planning practitioners do not know about the estate-bumping effects of
termination rights, they will continue to plan copyright authors' estates using
common estate planning techniques, not realizing that they are exposing
authors' estates to vulnerability.
A brief discussion of the estate planning mechanisms (other than Wills)
through which testamentary freedom flows is necessary in order to
understand the adverse effects the copyright statute has on testamentary
freedom. By foreclosing the availability of these mechanisms, the copyright
law places extreme limitations on testamentary freedom and has the potential
to destroy an author's estate plan and undermine the author's testamentary
intent. This list is not exhaustive of all the ways termination rights conflict
with testamentary freedom, but the discussion demonstrates the
pervasiveness of estate-bumping for some of the most common, modem
estate planning techniques.
289. In addition, these rights call into question the very nature of any donative transfer
of copyrights-whether the transfer is an irrevocable transfer, a revocable transfer, or a split
interest. Generally, an analysis of gifts, sales, and other transfers for gift and estate tax
purposes is partially based upon the irrevocable nature of such transfer. The right to terminate
a grant therefore raises multiple issues, which include the valuation of the right to terminate,
the inclusion of assets in the estate of a decedent possessing the right to terminate, and the
effect, if any, on certain intended irrevocable transfers, such as charitable and marital
deductions.
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1. Revocable Trusts
Although some copyright commentators believe that the problems
associated with Will-bumping will shortly cease to exist, copyright owners in
many jurisdictions are in for a rude awakening in 2013, when terminations of
copyright assignments first become effective. 90 The belief that termination
rights do not have a deleterious effect on estate planning because these rights
do not attach to transfers "by Will" lacks understanding of current
testamentary instruments. In many jurisdictions in the United States, the Will
simply is no longer the primary dispositive estate planning instrument of an
individual's assets. Rather, in these jurisdictions, a revocable trust, also
sometimes referred to as a "living trust," is used for the management and
distribution of an individual's assets at death.291 Therefore, for practical
purposes, in these jurisdictions, there will be no difference between Will-
bumping under the renewal system and the effects of estate-bumping by
termination rights.
A revocable trust 292 provides for the disposition of an individual's assets
at death and serves as a Will-substitute. "The revocable trust is one of the
most popular nontestamentary devices, 29 3 and is quickly becoming the
testamentary instrument of choice in many states, including California,
Florida, and New York (all of which have large intellectual property
industries).
290. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
291. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 19, at 299 ("Revocable inter vivos trusts have
come into widespread use .... ); WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 4, at 500 ("Inter vivos trusts,
particularly revocable trusts, are staples of the estate planner's inventory."); id. at 752
("Today, without doubt, private trusts ... sit at the core of modem estate-planning practice.");
Langbein, supra note 286, at 1113 ("[T]he revocable trust is the fundamental device that the
estate-planning bar employs to fit the carriage trade with highly individuated instruments...
."1).
292. The creator of the revocable trust, sometimes referred to as a "grantor" or a
"settler," transfers title of certain assets to the revocable trust. During the grantor's lifetime,
the trust can be revoked or amended by the grantor at any time. At the grantor's death, the
assets held by the trust pass according to the trust instrument and thus avoid the probate
process. The revocable trust agreement works in conjunction with a "pour-over" Will, a Will
that merely directs that any assets still in the grantor's name should pour-over and be disposed
of in accordance with the terms of the revocable trust agreement. Accordingly, the revocable
trust agreement contains most of the substantive and dispositive provisions that are normally
found in a Will.
293. KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING AND WEALTH PRESERVATION:
STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS 1 7.03, at 7-6 (abr. ed. 1998). See generally id. 1 7.03 (discussing
revocable trusts).
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Revocable trusts are popular due to their significant advantages over
Wills. 294 One great advantage of revocable trusts is that they are generally
not subject to court-supervised probate administration. Therefore the process
is more cost-effective and the instrument is usually not included in public
29
court records.  In contrast, when an individual dies with only a Will, the
Will is probated and an inventory of the probate assets is generally required
to be filed with the court. Both the Will and the inventory of assets are
generally matters of public record-there for all to see. However, there are
many reasons why individuals may appreciate privacy. For example, an
individual may be disinheriting a child or leaving assets to children in
disproportionate shares. In addition, an individual may be leaving assets to a
friend or co-worker and would not want others misconstruing their
intentions.9 6 Others may be gay and want to keep the dispositions of assets
private or out of a Will to avoid a potential Will contest by heirs under the
intestacy laws of the state. Putting the dispositive provisions of an estate plan
into a revocable trust will keep the dispositions private and will hide the
composition of the estate's assets from the public eye.
Revocable trusts also provide estate planning and elder law opportunities
to eventual incapacity of the grantor. For instance, if a grantor of a funded
revocable trust becomes incapacitated, the trustee can manage the assets for
the incapacitated individual's benefit free from the otherwise necessary
appointment of a costly court-supervised guardian.297
There are other advantages to using a revocable trust as well.
Immediately upon the grantor's death, a trustee is in a position immediately
to manage securities, pay expenses, and make distributions to beneficiaries
without the delay of probate. In addition, creditors should not be able to
attach trust property after the grantor's death. Finally, trusts created under a
revocable trust agreement are generally not subject to the court supervision
that is required for many actions involving trusts under a Will, such as the
appointment, removal, and resignation of trustees and changing situs of the
trust, should that become advisable (for example, to reduce state income tax).
Denying an author the ability of using funded revocable trust agreements
is a major incursion of an author's testamentary freedom. The effects of
294. For a general discussion concerning the advantages of revocable trusts, see JOEL
C. DOBRIS ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 511-12 (2d ed. 2003).
295. See id.
296. See HENKEL, supra note 293, 7.02, at 7-3.
297. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 19, at 317 ("Many persons are reluctant to
have a spouse or parent formally adjudicated an incompetent."); see also HENKEL, supra note
293, 7.03, at 7-7.
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termination rights on dispositions by revocable trusts will be as harsh as the
renewal system is on dispositions by Will. Because transfers by revocable
trust are not transfers "by Will," all dispositions by a funded revocable trust
will be subject to the estate-bumping aspects of termination rights.
For example, Sam is in his second marriage, and is now married to Sue.
Sam has children from the previous marriage as well as children from his
marriage with Sue. Sam has substantial wealth consisting of valuable
copyright interests and other valuable assets. Sam and Sue have retired to
Florida. Sam's new estate-planning practitioner drafts a revocable trust and a
pour-over Will for Sam, which is common in Florida. On his lawyer's
advice, Sam funds the revocable trust.298 Upon Sam's death, the revocable
trust establishes a continuing trust for his children from the previous
marriage with the copyright interests while the rest of his assets pass to Sue,
who will later provide for his children with Sue. This structure would avoid
potential conflicts between Sue and Sam's children from the previous
marriage at the time of Sam's death, while adequately providing for all
family members. Unfortunately, this well-prepared estate plan may be
destroyed by the estate-bumping aspects of the termination rights. Sue and
her children will have the required majority vote to bump Sam's estate plan
and retake the copyrights from the continuing trust. Although Sam's children
from the previous marriage will still benefit from the copyright interests
(they are also part of the statutory successor class of heirs), the children will
not benefit to the extent Sam had intended.
Although one might argue that copyright owners should only use Wills
and not revocable trusts, this edict would deprive copyright authors of the
many advantages of the revocable trust structure-severely restricting
authors' testamentary freedom in ways other property owners are not
restricted. In addition, because most estate-planning practitioners are
unfamiliar with copyright law, estate-planning practitioners will continue to
use revocable trust agreements, blissfully unaware of what awaits around the
comer. An author's inability to use a standard estate planning instrument,
such as a revocable trust, is an inexcusable intrusion on an author's
testamentary freedom.
298. Copyright interests are very appropriate assets with which to fund a revocable
trust because of the benefits from consolidating the management and control of copyrights
under a trust. See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing details concerning the benefits of consolidating
management and control of copyrights).
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2. Lifetime Transfers
Another example of how termination rights trample an author's
testamentary freedom is when these rights deprive an author of the
tremendous tax advantages of lifetime transfers. Lifetime gifts are highly tax-
favored transactions. An author can take advantage of the annual $12,000 tax
exclusion per donee.299 In addition, by properly utilizing the applicable credit
amount during an author's lifetime, the author may gift a certain amount of
assets free of transfer tax.300 Both the annual exclusion and the applicable
credit amount have the additional benefit of removing the income and
appreciation of these assets from the author's future gross estate for estate
tax purposes. Finally, even if subject to transfer tax, in general, lifetime gifts
are highly tax-favored as compared to transfers at death because the effective
gift tax rate is lower than the effective estate tax rate, and, once again, "[a]ny
income and appreciation accruing from the gifted property from the date of
the gift forward escape ... [further transfer] taxation to the donor., 30 1 Sadly,
these tax advantageous techniques are not as effective for authors. If an
author makes lifetime gifts of copyright interests and dies before the
termination rights vest in the author, the statutory heirs may potentially bump
these lifetime gifts.
a. Annual Exclusion
Certain lifetime gifts are not subject to transfer taxes. Under current
federal transfer tax law, every individual is allowed gift tax exclusions of
$12,000 per year per donee.3°2 The "annual exclusion" applies to gifts of
"present interests. '' 3 Generally, an outright gift of copyright interests would
qualify if it was given to an individual, to certain specially-structured trusts,
or to a family business entity. Because the annual exclusion applies to each
donee, the ability to diminish transfer tax liability is significant.
For example, Sue is in her second marriage, and is now married to Sam.
Sue and Sam have one adult, married child from their marriage. Sue has
three children from the previous marriage, all of whom are married. Sue has
299. See discussion infra note 302 (annual exclusion).
300. See discussion infra note 306 (applicable credit amount).
301. Id.
302. I.R.C. § 2503(b) (2000). The annual exclusion amount is adjusted for inflation
from an initial $10,000 amount from 1998. Id. Currently, the annual exclusion amount is
$12,000 per donee per year.
303. See id. § 2503(b)(1).
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accumulated great wealth in copyright and other assets. She has decided to
pursue an annual gifting regime of the copyright assets to her family, to
avoid increasing the size of her taxable gross estate at death. Sue can give
$12,000 in value of the copyright interests to each child and to each child-in-
law for a total of $96,000 per year. If Sue maintains this gifting regime for
only ten years, Sue can exclude $960,000 from her estate without paying any
transfer tax and without ever filing a gift tax return.
Once again, copyright law's estate-bumping deprives an author from
using this tax savings mechanism. Here, Sue pursued a tax efficient transfer
technique while furthering her testamentary intent of providing for all her
children equally in an effort to prevent family turmoil at her death.
Unfortunately, these lifetime gifts are subject to termination rights. If Sue
should die before the termination rights vest in her, Sue's statutory heirs
could bump Sue's estate plan. If Sam is alive at the time termination rights
vest, Sam and his one child could terminate the lifetime gift of copyrights,
thereby giving Sam a share in the copyright interests and decreasing the size
of the interests held by the children of Sue's previous marriage, If Sam is not
alive, Sue's children from the previous marriage could bump Sue's estate
plan by terminating her previous transfers of copyright interests. Thus, there
is great potential for manipulation and family turmoil. This potential of
bumping Sue's testamentary intent would occur regardless of whether Sue
gifted these interests outright to her children and their spouses, or if Sue
transferred these rights into trusts for the benefit of her descendants in order
to consolidate control and management of the assets.30 5 Because of the
termination rights, a majority of Sue's statutory successor class of heirs can
terminate copyright assignments and thwart Sue's testamentary intent.
Moreover, annual exclusion gifts can be made to individuals other than
immediate family members. Sue may want to take advantage of this tax-free
transfer technique to transfer copyright interests to siblings, parents, friends
304. This is in addition to the tax-free future appreciation in value of these assets once
outside of Sue's estate.
305. In general, transfers in trust are not present interest because the beneficiary of the
trust does not have the "unrestricted right to the immediate use, possession, or enjoyment of
property or the income from property." Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b) (as amended in 1983). One
technique used to qualify a transfer of property to a trust for the annual exclusion is by
granting one or more beneficiaries the right to withdraw the property from the trust for a
limited period of time. See Crummey v. Comm'r, 397 F.2d 82, 83 (9th Cir. 1968). This
withdrawal right, for practical purposes, grants the beneficiary the immediate possession of
the trust property, thereby qualifying the transfer as a present interest. The IRS has recognized
that a withdrawal power creates a present interest if there was no agreement between the
grantor and the beneficiaries that the beneficiaries will not exercise the withdrawal power.
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or family investment companies. Unfortunately, in all these situations, the
transfers have the potential of being bumped by Sue's statutory class of
successor heirs.
The effect of estate-bumping could be catastrophic from an estate
planning point of view and obviously could undermine an individual's
testamentary freedom. Once again, termination rights allow the statutory
class of heirs to bump an effective transfer tax strategy that all other property
owner's enjoy.
b. Applicable Credit
In addition to the $12,000 annual exclusion, every individual has an
"applicable credit amount" that shelters life-time transfers up to $1,000,000
from federal gift tax.306 The amount of an individual's applicable credit
amount not used by lifetime gifts may be available to shelter transfers taking
effect at death from estate tax. Using the applicable credit amount to make
lifetime taxable gifts, however, permits post-gift income and appreciation on
the transferred property to escape transfer tax instead of being subject to
transfer tax as part of the estate.
For example, Sue and Sam are married. Sue has accumulated great
wealth in copyright assets and other assets. She and Sam have four children,
one of whom has special needs and costly medical concerns. Upon Sam's
death, Sue decides to create a lifetime trust for the benefit of her child with
special needs in order to avoid any financial hardships that may occur from
potential delays during the probate process. Sue funds the child's trust with
her copyright interests in an amount equal to her applicable credit amount.
She chooses to fund the trust with copyright interests because she wisely
wants to consolidate management and control of these assets as well as
remove the appreciation of the assets from her estate. This transaction has no
gift tax consequences. Sue dies leaving the remainder of her estate to her
306. I.R.C. § 2505(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2001). Every individual receives a credit
against federal gift and estate taxes. In 2005, this credit could be used to transfer up to
$1,000,000 free of federal gift tax (over and above the annual exclusion gifts) and $1,500,000
free of federal estate tax. Compare I.R.C. § 2505(a)(1) (Supp. 2001), with I.R.C. § 2010(c)
(Supp. 2001). Under the Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, substantial
changes were made to the federal transfer tax system. The applicable credit amount for federal
estate tax purposes is scheduled to increase to $2,000,000 in 2006 through 2008, and increase
again to $3,500,000 in 2009. I.R.C. § 2010(c). A total repeal of the estate tax is scheduled to
be in effect in 2010 (the gift tax is currently not slated for repeal). The applicable credit
amount for federal gift tax purposes, however, is not scheduled to increase in future years
above its current $1,000,000 level.
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other children by Will. Sue was comfortable that she had adequately and
effectively provided for all of her children. Sue was wrong. This well-
structured estate plan is subject to being bumped by Sue's statutory heirs. If
termination rights do not vest in Sue, Sue's other children can terminate the
transfer of the copyright interests into the trust thereby bumping Sue's
testamentary intent.
Thus, termination rights interfere with authors' ability to provide for
their families as they see fit. They do not allow authors to balance the various
needs of their family members and plan the most effective estate plan to
achieve their goals. As just demonstrated, this intrusion on testamentary
freedom can have very harsh and unfair results.
c. Payment of Gift Tax
Even if an individual has already exhausted the applicable credit amount,
it is often more tax efficient to make lifetime gifts to beneficiaries and
actually pay gift tax than to leave property to them at death. Although the
federal estate tax and gift tax are currently imposed at the same rates, it is
often preferable to have a transfer subject to gift tax than estate tax. 307
Generally, the tax base for estate and gift taxes to which the unified tax rate
is applied is different. The gift tax is imposed on a tax exclusive basis,
whereas the estate tax is imposed on a tax inclusive basis. That is, for
lifetime gifts, the amount of a gift is defined as the value of the transferred
property, excluding any gift tax imposed on the transfer (i.e., there is no tax
on the tax). However, for transfers at death, the estate tax base includes all
property owned at death, including any amount used to pay the estate tax
(i.e., the tax is imposed on the transferred property before tax and is payable
out of the transferred property). To illustrate, assume Sue had $10,000,000
and the gift and estate tax rates are 50%; Sue could make a gift to her
children of $6,666,666 and pay $3,333,333 of gift tax (the tax is 50% of what
the children receive). However, if Sue died with the $10,000,000 and left
everything to her children, that $10,000,000 bequest would result in a
$5,000,000 estate tax (50% of what Sue owns at death). As a result, Sue's
children would receive only $5,000,000 as compared to the $6,666,666 from
the lifetime gifts-that is an additional $1,866,666 of transfer tax paid by
307. See BORIS I. BITrKER ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFr TAXATION 22 (9th ed.
2005) ("[F]or a transfer of a given amount, the effective burden of the estate tax is
substantially heavier than that of the gift tax, even though both taxes are imposed at the same
nominal rates."); HENKEL, supra note 293, I 8.01, at 8-2 ("[G]ifts are highly tax-favored as
compared to transfers at death.").
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making a transfer at death rather than making the transfer during her lifetime.
Thus, from a transfer tax perspective, lifetime gifts are preferable.
In addition to the different effective rates of gift and estate taxes, the
lifetime gifts have another advantage over transfers at death-the transfer
tax-free nature of the income and appreciation on assets transferred during an
individual's lifetime.30 8 Generally, all income from and appreciation of
property transferred during an individual's life escapes future gift and estate
tax.
Once again, termination rights preclude the effective use of this tax
advantageous mechanism for transferring property. Lifetime gifts, even
donative in nature, are subject to termination rights. Therefore, even the most
basic of tax advantageous estate planning strategies is precluded from
copyright owners. Any lifetime transfer of copyright is subject to the
potential of estate-bumping. If the termination rights do not vest in the donor,
the donor's statutory heirs can terminate the lifetime transfer of copyrights.
Again, this is a draconian restriction on an author's testamentary freedom.
3. Family Holding Entities
3°9
An excellent estate planning tool for copyright interests is the creation of
a family holding entity. 310 Unless an author has only one heir, or is planning
to give all his or her copyright interests to one beneficiary, some sort of
business entity can be used to unify management and control over the
copyright interests (and other assets) after the author's death. Without unified
management and control, the co-owners of the copyrights could compete to
exploit the copyrights, which could impair the value of the copyrights.
Generally, copyright ownership becomes fragmented when the copyright
is gifted or bequeathed to more than one beneficiary (or reverts back to more
308. HENKEL, supra note 293, § 8.03, at 8-5 ("[Tlhe rate on the income and
appreciation of the gifted assets after the gift is made is hard to beat.").
309. Much has been written recently on the use of family holding companies in estate
planning, discussing the valuation discounts associated therewith and the retained interest
issues pertaining to the inclusion of the value of the entity in the transferor's gross estate. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to review these considerations.
310. Like any operating business, a family holding company may take one of a variety
of forms, including general partnerships, limited partnerships, corporations (which may or
may not elect S status under the tax law), limited liability companies, business trusts or
proprietorships. This Article does not consider choice of entity issues (i.e., whether
corporations, partnerships or limited liability companies are the best entity to hold and manage
copyright interests).
311. Cheryl E. Hader, Making the Intangible Tangible: Planning for Intellectual
Property, 29 EST. PLAN. 574, 575-76 (2002).
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than one member of the statutory class of successor heirs). 312 "Fragmentation
of copyright ownership creates very serious administrative problems because
it results in" the inconsistency of management and control of the
copyright.313 Each joint owner of the copyright, without the consent of the
other co-owners, can exploit the work individually, or grant nonexclusive
licenses to others. 3 14 In addition, the more important grants-the grants of
315
exclusive rights in copyright-require all the co-owners to agree.
Fragmented management and control of a copyright obviously is not the
most efficient and effective means to maximize the value of copyrights.
Effective marketing of copyrights could be inhibited if the co-owners are
unable to reach an agreement on marketing strategy.316 Therefore, an author
may want to consolidate management and control for the efficient
exploitation of copyright. In addition, the author may prefer to consolidate
management and control in the hands of an individual who has sufficient
expertise in the exploitation of the copyright.317 Therefore, consolidating
control allows the copyright to be marketed more efficiently and effectively.
The author can prevent fragmentation of ownership and control simply
by transferring the ownership of the copyrights to a family holding entity
before death. In addition to centralizing management and control, this
mechanism facilitates gift giving, allows the entity to benefit from economies
of scale, qualifies for special tax provisions, 318 shifts income among family
members, and protects the assets from claims of creditors. In addition, a
family holding company also permits an individual to transfer limited
interests of the family holding company (and thereby the underlying assets)
to others in a tax efficient manner. For gift tax purposes, the value of these
transferred interests would be equal to the value of the pro rata share of the
assets held in the family holding entity reduced by a "valuation discount"
derived from the characteristics of the interests.31 9
312. See Richard E. Halperin, Vehicles for Artists' Holding and Transferring of
Copyrights, 22 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 435, 440 (1998).
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 440-41.
316. Hader, supra note 311, at 576.
317. Id.
318. See I.R.C. § 303 (2000) (providing redemption of corporate stock to pay estate
taxes of decedent shareholder); I.R.C. § 6166 (amended 2001) (providing deferment of full
payment of estate taxes where value of interest in closely held business exceeds 35% of
adjusted gross estate).
319. The transfer tax valuation discounts applicable to transfers of nonvoting or
minority interests in a family holding company would be those generally recognized by the
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The consolidation of management and control under family holding
entities makes this mechanism ideal for transfers of copyright interests. In
addition, the valuation discounts make gifts of family holding entity interests
an ideal way to maximize the advantages of annual exclusion gifts, the
unified credit amount, and taxable transfers. Unfortunately, termination
rights subject the use of this technique to the possibility of estate-bumping.
Once again, the conflict between copyright law and testamentary freedom
produces harsh results and deprives copyright authors of an estate planning
mechanism used by other property owners.
4. Charities
Gifts to charity are treated favorably under the federal tax regime. No
gift or estate tax is imposed upon a gratuitous transfer to qualified charities 3
20
because these transfers qualify for the "charitable contribution" deduction. 321
In addition, an individual may be entitled to an income tax deduction for
gifts of property to charity.322
There are many ways to take advantage of the charitable deduction,
including outright gifts to charitable entities, the creation of charitable
remainder trusts and charitable lead trusts, and the creation of private
foundations or public charities. Unfortunately, an author's charitable
courts and the IRS as appropriate for transfers of non-controlling interests in closely-held
entities, including (i) a minority discount that reflects the inability of the transferee member to
participate in managing the company and to control distribution and liquidation decisions and
(ii) a lack of marketability discount that reflects the absence of any real market for the
transferred interest. Although the appropriate size of the discount should be determined by an
independent valuation appraiser, the combined effect of the two discounts usually will result
in a reduction in value in the range of 20% to 40%, and discounts up to 50% have been
upheld. Therefore, when an individual transfers interests in the family holding entity, the
value of the interests will be devalued for transfer tax purposes, thereby allowing the
individual to get a bigger bang for the tax buck. See Harwood v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 239, 268
(1984) (holding 50% discount allowed based on lack of control, lack of marketability, and
restrictions on transferability), affid, 786 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table
decision).
320. See I.R.C. § 2522(a).
321. See I.R.C. § 2055, amended by Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-
280, § 1218, 120 Stat. 780, 1080-83; I.R.C. § 2522, amended by Pension Protection Act of
2006 § 1218.
322. See I.R.C. § 170 (amended 2006). For example, if an individual makes a $50,000
gift to charity, the individual may be entitled to a $50,000 income tax deduction (subject to
certain limitations depending upon the type of charity and depending on the individual's gross
income).
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intentions can be circumvented by the statutory class of heirs if the author
does not live long enough to have the termination rights vest.
For example, if Sam makes an inter vivos donative gift of all his
copyright interests to a charitable entity and also bequests by Will any
remaining copyright interests to the same charity, but dies before termination
rights vest in Sam, Sam's statutory successor class of heirs can bump the
charitable gift and take ownership of the copyright interests. If Sam dies
before exercising his termination rights, he does not own any copyright
interests, and nothing passes to the charity.323 Therefore, estate bumping
would thwart Sam's charitable intention and deprive the charity of expected
assets.
5. Modem Family Concerns
a. Prenuptial Agreements
Generally, the law permits two individuals to agree upon how their
property will be treated during marriage, upon the event of divorce and at
death. These agreements can be entered into before marriage (prenuptial or
pre-marital agreements) or after marriage (postnuptial or ante-nuptial
agreements). It is common for individuals to enter prenuptial agreements if
one or both have, or expect to have, large estates or if one or both have
children from a previous marriage. Although courts will scrutinize the
circumstances under which the agreement was entered, the agreement will
usually be enforced if the parties complied with the requirements of the
state.324 Often, the agreement provides for the disposition of property upon
the death of a spouse; a spouse will often waive the elective share and other
marital rights for some present consideration.
For example, consider if Sam and Sue execute a prenuptial agreement,
whereby Sam will pay Sue $2,000,000 on the date of their marriage (each
323. In another example, Sam permanently licenses a portion of the exclusive interests
of a copyright to a corporation for an income stream, but retains other exclusive interests of
the copyright. By Will, Sam bequeaths all of his copyright interests to a charity. After the
author's death, only Sam's retained interests pass to the charity. The exclusive interests that
were permanently licensed to the corporation remain with the corporation because the author
did not live long enough to exercise any termination rights. However, in this scenario the
statutory class of heirs may still terminate the assignment to the corporation. When the
statutory heirs exercise their termination rights, the interests licensed to the corporation will
pass to the statutory class of heirs and not to the charity as Sam intended.
324. HENKEL, supra note 293, 39.01, at 39-2 ("The requirements of marital property
agreements are governed by state law .... ").
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their second) and Sue waives alimony payments if they divorce and waives
her elective share and other marital rights. Sam has children from a previous
marriage. Sam and Sue get married and Sam pays Sue $2,000,000. Sam and
Sue have one child. Sam creates a funded revocable trust, which ultimately
benefits all of his children. Sam funds the trust with most of his assets,
including valuable copyright assets. If the termination rights do not vest in
Sam before his death, Sue and her child could terminate the transfer of
copyrights to the revocable trust and economically benefit from the copyright
interests despite Sue being paid a substantial sum for waiving all her interest
in Sam's property. This is an extremely unfair intrusion into an author's
testamentary freedom.
b. Blended and Nontraditional Families
Stepfamilies are on the rise in the United States.325 In a second marriage,
if one or both spouses have children from a previous marriage, a number of
significant issues exist. In every blended family, there are intrinsic conflicts
because of the family structure. Some conflicts in blended families are often
inevitable (1) between the children from a previous marriage and the parent's
new spouse and (2) between the children of the previous marriage, the
children from the parent's new spouse's previous marriage, and any children
the second marriage may produce. These conflicts can arise on both the
financial and the emotional level. Having the flexibility to structure the
disposition of property through inter vivos gifts and transfers at death can
help soothe some of these inevitable conflicts.
Termination rights, however, severely limit the estate planning
techniques that an author may use to avoid potential conflicts between family
members. Any lifetime dispositions are subject to estate-bumping. The
requirement that there must be a majority of statutory heirs to terminate and
to manage the copyright after termination is ripe for conflict in blended
families. The surviving spouse must be joined by at least one child in the
decision making process. Mandating that the surviving spouse and all
children have termination rights forces children from a previous marriage
and the surviving spouse into otherwise avoidable conflicts.
Modem families also consist of couples, either of the same or opposite
sex, who live together in committed relationships but outside the legal
325. In fact, one commentator notes that "[olne out of every three Americans is now a
stepparent, a stepchild, a stepsibling, or some other member of a stepfamily." Jan Larson,
Understanding Stepfamilies, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, July 1992, at 36, 36.
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framework of traditional marriage. 326 Many same-sex couples prefer to use
funded revocable trusts for dispositive provisions instead of a Will due to
privacy concerns and to protect against potential Will challenges. As
discussed previously, however, revocable trusts are subject to estate-
bumping. In addition, under the copyright law, an author's same-sex partner
(legally married or not) is excluded from the statutory class of successor
heirs.327
As the preceding analysis makes glaringly clear, copyright law continues
to severely limit a copyright author's testamentary freedom. The estate-
bumping phenomenon caused by termination rights, in effect, prohibits an
author from using the most effective estate planning tools and efficient tax
planning strategies, to the detriment of the author's best interests. In addition,
it does not allow an author the flexibility to adjust an estate plan to family
needs and desires. Thus, termination rights and estate-bumping problems not
only undermine testamentary freedom, but unwittingly limit the role of sound
judgment in estate planning.
B. Ineffectiveness of Copyright Law
1. Original Intent Undermined
The main policy reason for creating a statutory class of heirs was to
provide protection for surviving family members after the author's death.328
However, the statutory successor provisions no longer benefit from this
purported justification. Under current copyright law, copyright interests do
not fall into the public domain after an author's death nor do termination
rights attach to transfers by Will. This simple change in law undermines the
focus of the original intent behind the creation of the statutory class.
Copyright reversion is no longer a compulsory bequest. Therefore, the
statutory heir provisions are no longer effective with regard to their original
purpose.
326. See Jennifer Steinhauer, No Marriage, No Apologies, N.Y. TIMEs, July 6, 1995, at
Cl.
327. Federal law does not recognize same-sex marriage. Defense of Marriage Act § 3,
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
328. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 582 (1956) ("The evident purpose...
is to provide for the family of the author after his death. Since the author cannot assign his
family's renewal rights, [it] takes the form of a compulsory bequest of the copyright to the
designated persons.").
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One could argue that the original intent of these provisions was to create
a type of federal intestacy provision.329 If this was the intent, however, then
the provisions would be subordinate to the author's express disposition-in
other words, these provisions would function only in the absence of a devise
or gift, which they do not as currently drafted.33 °
2. Circumventing Copyright Law with Will Contracts
Current copyright law may be ineffective in yet another way. A party
licensing a copyright interest can simply request that the license expire at the
author's death and then insist that the author execute a contract whereby the
author would promise to bequeath to the licensing party by Will all copyright
interests. Generally, a contract to make a Will or to bequeath certain property
331is valid, assuming the requirements for a valid contract are met. Questions
regarding the validity of a Will contract are questions of contract law and not
estates law. The contract instrument cannot be probated (as a Will) if the
bequest is not made, but a cause of action against the estate can arise if the
contract is not performed.332 Therefore, if the author does not bequeath the
licensee the copyright interest, the licensee may sue for breach. If the author
left the licensee the copyright interest by Will, the statutory class of heirs
could not terminate the transfer, thus undermining the objective of granting
an author's family a second bite at the apple.
329. However, each state has intestacy statutes and the creation of a federal intestacy
hierarchy would be redundant and inefficient.
330. The statutory successor provisions cannot benefit from the argument that the class
of heirs are the author's likely beneficiaries and the author is otherwise incapable of protecting
his or her interests. For example, in Saroyan v. William Saroyan Foundation, the court held
that William Saroyan's bequest of copyrights in his work to a private foundation was
ineffective in light of the superior nature of the statutory heirs. 675 F. Supp. 843, 845-46
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). The Foundation claimed that Saroyan had a bad relationship with his
children and that Saroyan deliberately disinherited them. See id. at 844. The court held that the
renewal rights belong to his children "regardless of the author's own wishes." Id. at 846.
331. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-514 (amended 1990), 8 U.L.A. 159-60 (1998).
332. For further discussion of the validity of Will contracts, see McGOVERN & KURTz,
supra note 76, § 4.9, at 226-34; WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 4, at 669-75; EUGENE F.
ScOLES Er AL., PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND TRUSTS 245-49 (6th
ed. 2000).
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C. Inefficiency of Copyright Law
1. Duplicative
In addition to driving a wedge between copyright law and estates laws,
the mandatory statutory class of successor heirs provisions duplicate state
law protections and are therefore unnecessary. The purpose underlying the
creation of the statutory successor class of heirs is the protection of family
members. Congress protects an author's family members essentially by
granting them reversionary rights if the author should die before the rights
vest in the author.333 States' estates laws already provide protections for
surviving family members through spousal rights and community property
laws. There is no need to provide an additional protective element for
families of authors. The renewal system provides an additional mechanism,
which combined with state estates law protections of family members, grants
an unprecedented and unintended windfall to family members who are
already protected under a state's estates law. For instance, consider if an
author's estate consisted of valuable copyrights and other assets. Under
current copyright and estates law, the surviving spouse not only could
exercise the "elective share" against the author's estate (claiming a one-third
to one-half interest in the author's estate), but also could later exercise the
renewal rights on the copyrights. By doing so, the surviving spouse would
receive a greater percentage of the estate value than the elective share
intended. In addition, suppose a married couple had executed a prenuptial or
ante-nuptial agreement, whereby each party waived any spousal rights to
separate and marital property, and also waived all spousal protections
provided under state law (i.e., elective share, homestead, etc.). Under current
law, a surviving spouse could nevertheless terminate any copyright interest
that the deceased spouse transferred during life. By doing so, the surviving
spouse will have diminished the other beneficiaries' shares of the author's
estate through the use of termination rights.
2. Arbitrary Nature of Timing
The arbitrary nature of the timing of an author's death demonstrates the
absurdity of the termination of transfer rights and their conflict with
testamentary freedom. The timing of an author's death plays an important
role in determining the extent of an author's testamentary freedom over
333. See supra Part IH.B.
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copyright interests, with respect to when termination rights vest. Because
notice of termination can be sent up to ten years early, if the author lives
twenty-five years after the grant and serves the required notice the year
before death, the termination rights vest in the author thereby preventing the
vesting of termination rights in the members of the statutory class of heirs.334
This would be the case even if the author died the day after properly serving
termination notice-more than nine years before the actual termination date.
However, if the author died at the same time after the assignment of
copyright, but this time without properly serving notice of termination, any
assignments-gifts and even certain attempted bequests-can be bumped by
the statutory class of heirs. Simply, if the window of opportunity for
terminating prior assignments begins on January 1, 2015, the author could
exercise termination rights in January, 2005. If the author dies in 2006, the
rights pass to the author's estate. If the author failed to exercise termination
rights in January, 2005 (figuring there were ten years to exercise the
termination right) and dies in February, then the author's statutory heirs take
the termination rights. The arbitrary timing of the vesting of termination
rights creates differing dispositive treatment of the estates of different
authors.
3. Inconsistent Restraints on Authors
If the author does not have a widow, widower, or surviving descendants,
the author's executor, administrator, personal representative, or trustee
receives the termination rights. If an author makes lifetime gifts, an executor
may terminate any transfer of copyright interests made by the author and
then convey ownership of the copyrights in accordance with the author's
testamentary intention. This is because an executor has a duty to "distribute
the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of any probated and
effective [W]ill. ' 335 On the other hand, an author who is survived by a
spouse or descendant cannot rely on his statutory heirs to follow his or her
testamentary intent because the heirs have no duty to abide by the Will.
Therefore, the testamentary freedom of an author who is survived by a
spouse or child is more limited than one who is not.
334. This is not a solution to the estate-bumping problem, however, because estate-
bumping would still occur in the estates of authors who did not survive until the vesting
period or those who did not timely serve notice before their deaths.
335. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-703 (amended 1997), 8 U.L.A. 138-40 (1998 & Supp.
2005).
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4. Devaluation of Copyright Interests
Termination rights devalue the economic value of copyright interests.
Congress has a constitutional mandate "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts. 336 Congressional authority to grant copyrights rests on the
premise that the provision of a financial incentive "promote[s] the Progress
of Science and useful Arts." In other words, the prospect of financial
remuneration stimulates artistic creativity, which in turn will benefit public
knowledge. Termination rights, however, arguably diminish and devalue the
property interests of copyright owners and deprive the public of access to
creative works (except to the extent and at the price that the statutory
successor chooses to establish).
Currently, copyright law takes significant control over the disposition of
copyright interests away from authors, bars authors from using the most
efficient and effective estate planning techniques, precludes authors from
implementing the most tax advantageous strategies, and prevents authors
from benefiting from centralizing management and control of their copyright
interests under corporations, partnerships, and trusts. Denying these benefits,
which are available to other personal property individuals might own,
unnecessarily devalues copyrights as a property interest.
Moreover, the statutory heir provisions constrict an author's ability to
exercise any artistic control over the manner of publication and exploitation
of his or her work at or after death. As Justice Frankfurter recognized, "If an
author cannot make an effective assignment of his renewal, it may be
worthless to him when he is most in need., 337 If the interest created by the
statutory successor class of heirs takes precedence over the author's desires,
that author has lost a claim of ownership and control of his or her creative
work, unless the author survives the vesting date.
It has been argued, however, that testamentary freedom promotes
338production, creativity, and investment. Allowing an author the pleasure of
bequeathing or gifting his or her property could induce an author to create
more works.
336. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
337. Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 657 (1943).
338. See discussion supra Part Il.B.
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D. Unconstitutionality of Copyright Law
1. Outside Scope of Copyright Power
In addition to all the other problems associated with termination rights,
they may be unconstitutional as well. Under the Copyright Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, Congress does not have the power to create exclusive property
rights to non-authors who claim adversely to the author's express wishes.339
The Constitution states with some specificity that Congress has the power
"[tlo promote the Progress of Science... by securing for limited Times to
Authors... the exclusive Right to their... Writings. ' 34° The Supreme Court
has repeatedly emphasized that authorship is the source to copyright and that
the protection of creative and intellectual endeavors is the sole justification
for the copyright estate.
341
In fact, this congressional limitation was made clear in the Trade-Mark
Cases.342 Under these cases, the Court held that the Copyright Clause did not
grant Congress the authority to enact a complete intellectual property regime
unless its protection was limited to authors or those claiming under
authors.343 A federal trademark statute was beyond the power conferred by
339. Congress created termination rights through the exercise of the powers granted
under the Copyright Clause. This Article does not address whether Congress has the power to
create termination rights for a statutory class of heirs under its Commerce Clause powers.
340. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Justice Story opined that "[t]he power, in its terms, is
confined to authors and inventors; and cannot be extended to the introducers of any new
works or inventions." JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 559, at 403 (abr. ed. 1833). In addition, one commentator wrote, after the passage of
the 1909 Act:
Copyright can only, under the Constitution, be given to authors .... By a further
process of construction, the word "author" includes assigns or legal representatives of
an author.... On the other hand, the Constitution would seem to exclude the granting
of copyright to one who is not the author or does not claim under the author.
WELL, supra note 153, at 44-45 (footnotes omitted).
341. See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1991)
(holding that the Copyright Clause did not permit protection of the routine arrangement of
names and telephone numbers in the white pages of a phone book because the constitutional
limitation that copyright be granted only to authors presupposes that the author to whom
copyright was granted exercised some minimal degree of creativity); see also United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60-61 (1884).
342. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
343. See id. at 94. The Court reserved the question of whether a congressional exercise
under the Commerce Clause would support trademark legislation because Congress had not
invoked that power. Id. at 95.
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the Copyright Clause because rights under trademark law depended on
priority of appropriation rather than intellectual labor.3" The Court opined
that while the word "Writings" may be liberally construed, the Copyright
Clause limited Congress to protecting "the fruits of intellectual labor." 345
Conferring termination rights on the statutory heirs regardless of the
author's contrary intent (or regardless of an author's actual attempt to
disinherit a statutory heir) grants copyright interests to an individual who is
neither an author nor an individual who can claim under the author. The
creation of a statutorily mandated class of heirs seems to contradict the
constitutional mandate of securing "to Authors ...the exclusive Right to
their . . . Writings." The "Right" created under the termination rights
provisions of the copyright code are clearly not the author's.
One court has opined about the constitutionality of the statutory class of
heirs under copyright law. Notably, this case involved an exercise of renewal
rights rather than termination rights. In Venegas-Hernandez v. Peer,4 a case
involving a copyright infringement action by a songwriter's children against
the songwriter's widow, the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico held that copyright law governed ownership of copyright
interests rather than the testamentary disposition attempted by the deceased
author.34 7  Plaintiffs argued that Congress overstepped its limited
constitutional authority of granting exclusive copyright protections to authors
by creating the statutory class of heirs.348 The court opined that the plaintiffs
could not logically make this argument because the plaintiffs (like the widow
claiming under the statutory heir provisions) were not authors and could only
benefit from the congressionally created renewal terms.
Plaintiffs cite "testamentary freedoms." However, the rights to renewal here
do not arise from the Plaintiffs' testament, but from an explicit right granted
by the Copyright Act after the death of an author prior to vesting. Plaintiffs
have been granted a right to renewal here by the same statutory provisions
that they are, in effect, asking to void in preference of testamentary intent.
349
The court also identified that because copyright renewal terms are
distinct and separate estates, an author has no ability to bequeath the renewal
344. Id. at 94.
345. Id. (emphasis omitted).
346. 283 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D.P.R. 2003).
347. See id. at 497.
348. Id. at 496.
349. Id. at 497 (citation omitted).
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term by testament if the author did not survive until the interest vested in the
author.35°
Regardless of its logic, the court's legal reasoning in Venegas-Hernandez
is not applicable to termination rights. Copyright duration is no longer
confined to a two-term renewal system, but rather a single extended term.
Unlike renewal rights, termination rights do not create a distinct and separate
property interest-the copyright term is continuous. Therefore, a
testamentary freedom argument carries much greater weight and accordingly
the creation of termination rights in the statutory heirs is beyond the scope of
Congress' copyright power. The claim of a statutory heir is not based on the
consent of the author, any creative contribution to the production of the
intellectual work on behalf of the statutory heir, or any commitment that the
income will be used to promote science. Therefore, Congress stepped outside
of the Copyright Clause in their creation of termination rights.
2. A Potential Taking
Under the 1976 Act, an author can sever and transfer in whole or in part
any one in the bundle of property rights comprised in copyright. If
termination rights are one in the bundle of various rights comprised in
copyright law, an author should be able to freely transfer this right, and any
deprivation of this right may constitute a taking similar to the testamentary
limitations found in Hodel v. Irving and Babbitt v. Youpee. 35 1 However, if
termination rights are not a copyright interest, but rather a separate property
right distinct from the underlying copyright, then Congress clearly
overstepped its limited constitutional power under the Copyright Clause. The
creation of statutory heirs under the termination rights provisions of the
copyright law generates a conflict between an author's claim to property
ownership in his or her work and a non-author's claim of ownership. An
interpretation of the termination provisions that gives preference to express
dispositions made by an author (whether by Will or gift) over the interests of
a statutory heir seems more in line with Congress' constitutional mandate.
350. Seeid. at497&n.1.
351. Hodel, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997). Both cases involved a
federal statutory limitation on the testamentary freedom of property owners, similar to the way
termination rights limit copyright authors' testamentary freedom. For a discussion of Hodel
and Youpee, see supra Part II.C.
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In 2013, copyright authors will begin to feel the full impact of the
unintended destructive nature of termination rights. Despite the belief among
some copyright scholars that the conflict between copyright law and
testamentary freedom no longer exists, the estate-bumping effects of
termination rights will soon be at hand. As a result, copyright authors will
either be severely limited in creating efficient and effective estate plans or
will unknowingly execute estate planning instruments that may be subject to
the nullifying effects of estate-bumping. Either result is unacceptable.
The copyright code can be minimally revised to reconcile the conflict
between copyright law and estates law, while furthering the rationales for
termination rights and testamentary freedom. The theory behind termination
rights and the theory behind testamentary freedom are not naturally at
odds-both have the goal of maximizing the value of property. Termination
rights are intended to grant authors a second chance to profit from their
works after an original transfer of copyright. In essence, the goal is to
increase the profitability from copyrights, not limit donative transfers. The
problem is that termination rights, with their corresponding statutory class of
successor heirs, cast too large a net. The provisions are drafted so broadly
that termination rights apply to all transfers, whether for the author's profit or
not.
The copyright code can be amended to decrease the conflict between
copyright law and testamentary freedom in two ways, both having the same
effect. This can be accomplished without undermining the reasons for
creating reversionary rights for authors in the first place. First, the copyright
act provision which already specifically extinguishes termination rights (of
the statutory heirs) for copyrights transferred by Will could be expanded to
extinguish termination rights for transfers of copyrights by any other Will-
substitutes, testamentary substitutes, or donative transfers. Second, the
copyright act could be amended so that the statutory heirs can only exercise
termination rights regarding copyrights transferred for profit or for bona-fide
business purposes. Either amendment preserves the basic copyright principle
that authors should have a second chance to profit from their works. These
amendments focus on reversionary rights after an author's death; the
amendments will respect more fully the author's testamentary freedom.
Absent such amendments, the current copyright act will soon herald a new
era of estate-bumping that unwittingly frustrates and diminishes the liberty
interests of copyright authors.
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